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The doctrine of command responsibility imposes a duty on military
commanders and civilian officials to ensure that subordinate troops adhere
to the requirements of the law of war. These officers are presumed to
possess the knowledge, authority and power to prevent and to punish the
transgressions of combatants. The imposition of criminal culpability is
intended to create an incentive to insure that subordinates abide by the
humanitarian law of war. This extension of liability is necessitated by the
lethal consequences resulting from the contravention of the code of
conflict.!
The parameters of command responsibility remain imprecise. Legal
decisions in this area, for the most part, have been the product of post-war
prosecutions. These courts have not enjoyed the political insulation,
inclination or opportunity to engage in the type of sustained deliberation
which is required to draw detailed distinctions.2
The potential harshness of command responsibility is illustrated by
the victorious Union government's 1865 prosecution of Confederate
t Professor, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D.,
American; Ph.D., Northwestern; LL.M., Harvard. Affiliate member of the Departments of
Political Science & Germanic Studies; Member of the Program on Jewish Studies.
1. See Colonel William G. Eckhardt, Command Criminal Responsibility: A Plea For A
Workable Standard, 97 MIL. L. REv. 1, 4-11 (1982).
2. See Comment, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 82 YALE L.J. 1274 (1973).
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Captain Henry Wirz. 3 Wirz was convicted of conspiracy to injure the
health and to destroy the lives of individuals interned in the Andersonville,
Georgia prison camp as well as with direct acts of cruelty.4 In February
1864, the newly-opened camp was placed under the command of General
John H. Winder, Superintendent of the Military Prisons of the Confeder-
acy, who was assisted by his son, Captain W.S. Winder.' A month later,
German immigrant William Wirz was named to head the institution.' This
appointment was an expression of appreciation by Confederate President
Jefferson Davis for Wirz's loyal service to the confederacy on the
battlefield as well as in diplomatic relations with Europe
Andersonville was constructed for 10,000 inmates, but within four
months of Wirz's appointment, the population reached 33,000.8 The
prisoners found themselves in penal purgatory. The Southern forces were
in rapid retreat and there was little food, clothing, medicine or shelter
available for the captured combatants. 9 The prison had been built adjacent
to a swamp and the inmates were overwhelmed by mosquitoes and flies
which deposited maggots in the gangrenous wounds of the living and
infested the corpses of the dead. As a result, diarrhea, dysentery, dropsy,
pneumonia, gangrene and scurvy rapidly raged through the camp. l0 Nearly
forty percent of the prisoners died during confinement; an additional 2,000
expired following release.1 Corpses were carted off by the wagonload and
buried without coffins.12 The guards proved to be undisciplined, corrupt
and ineffective in controlling the population.13
Wirz contended at trial that he had been helpless to alleviate the
conditions in the camp, pointing out that that the Union blockade and lack
of factory and farm labor had resulted in food shortages. 4 He pled that
events were "beyond my power to control.... [T]he shortness of
rations... the overcrowded state of the prison.., the inadequate ...
3. The Trial of Captain Henry Wirz for Conspiracy and Murder, Washington D.C., 1865
in AMERICAN STATE TRIALS, VOL. VIII 657 (John D. Lawson ed. 1917) [hereinafter Wirz].
4. Id. at 659.
5. Id. at 658.
6. Id. at 658 n.1.
7. See id. at 658-59.
8. Id. at 658, 699.
9. See Wirz, supra note 3, at 660.
10. Id. at 660-61.
11. Id. at 658.
12. Id. at 772.
13. Id. at 701.
14. Id. at 662.
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clothing, want of shelter ... [I was] the tool in the hands of my superiors."15
The Confederate government in Richmond disregarded a steady stream of
reports by inspectors which described the depredations in the camp as a
"'reproach to the Confederates as a nation. ' , 16 Wirz reinforced these
reports in a series of letters protesting the inferior quality of bread rations,
the shortage of buckets to hold and store the inmates' food, the lack of
shoes for paroled prisoners working in the prison" and the poor health
care and the over-crowded conditions.18
Wirz pled that "'I was not the monster that I have been depicted as
being; I did not cause or delight in the spectacle of.. .sufferings ... on the
contrary, I did what little lay in my power to diminish or alleviate them.""'9
He queried how he could be held responsible for and remedy the lack of
rations, overcrowded conditions, inadequate clothing and shortage of
shelter." Despite these protestations, Wirz was convicted of conspiracy as
well as direct acts of cruelty and murder and was sentenced to death by
hanging.2' He was determined to have resided over a camp whose
conditions contravened the international law of war.22 The judge advocate
insisted that the atrocities of Andersonville resulted from the "intrinsic
wickedness" of a few "desperate leaders" who were assisted by heartless
monsters" such as Henry Wirz." The advocate inveighed that "there is no
law, no sympathy, no code of morals" which can excuse the excesses of the
accused.24
25Wirz was held to a standard of strict liability and executed. Was it
equitable and just to hold Wirz responsible for the conditions and
casualties in the camp? What additional avenues of redress were available?
15. Wirz, supra note 3, at 684. Wirz engaged in acts of cruelty such as withholding rations,
establishing a "dead-line" which resulted in the killing of individuals crossing the boundary,
condemning individuals to chain gangs and confining prisoners in stocks and abusing,
killing and flogging internees. See id. at 662.
16. Id. at 7t4 (supplemental letter, Sept. 9, 1864, from Acting Adjutant and Inspector-
General Chandler to Colonel R.H. Chilton, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector-General,
Richmond).
17. Id. at 739.
18. Id. at 732.
19. Id. at 861-62.
20. Id. at 684.
21. Wirz, supra note 3, at 873.
22. Id. at 807.
23. Id. at 808.
24. Id. at 832.
25. Id. at 667.
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Should Wirz reasonably have been expected to elevate moral principle
over patriotism? Were not those in Richmond who disregarded reports
recounting the conditions in the camp equally guilty? Was the imposition
of criminal culpability on Wirz merely an expression of retribution and
revenge? Could the killing of this accented European be seen an exercise
in selective and victor's justice?26
These questions are central to command responsibility. This article
traces the development of the doctrine from World War I to the contem-
porary era in order to document the diverse strands which have shaped the
newly-drafted article on command culpability in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.27 The latter, as will be seen, is the culmina-
tion of almost eighty years of debate, discussion and judicial decision
concerning the contours and content of command responsibility." This is
no mere intellectual investigation; command responsibility is central to the
campaign to bring high-ranking civilian and military leaders charged with
war crimes and crimes against humanity before the bar of justice."
I. WORLD WAR I
The Preliminary Peace Conference at Versailles appointed a Commis-
sion on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement
of Penalties to report on the responsibility for World War I and the
breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the German
Empire and her allies.'o The commission concluded that the conflict
resulted from the premeditated plan of the Central Powers and Turkey
and Bulgaria.31 However, it determined that the initiation of a war of
aggression was not prohibited under positive international law and
26. See generally Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing The Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV.
2203 (1992); David Luban et al., Moral Responsibility in the Age of Bureaucracy, 90 MICH.
L. REV. 2348 (1992); David Luban, Contrived Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957 (1999).
27. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 28 U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.
183/9 (July 17, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
28. See L.C. Green, Command Responsibility in International Humanitarian Law, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 319 (1995).
29. See generally Christopher N. Crowe, Command Responsibility in the Former
Yugoslavia: The Chances for Successful Prosecution, 29 U. RiCH. L. REv. 191, (1994); M.
Feria Tinta, Commanders on Trial: The Blaskic' Case and the Doctrine of Command
Responsibility Under international Law, 47 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 293 (2000).
30. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of
Penalties (March 29, 1919), 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920) [hereinafter Commission on the
Responsibility on the Authors of the War].
31. Id. at 107.
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accordingly did not result in the imposition of international responsibi ity. 2
The commission also found that the German Empire and her allies had
engaged in "outrages of every description committed on land, at sea, and
in the air, against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity."33
These included the "most cruel practices which primitive barbarism" aided
by the "resources of modern science" could devise for the "execution of a
system of terrorism. 34
The commission made the unprecedented proposal that individuals
responsible for these atrocities should be subject to criminal prosecution,
regardless of rank or status." According to the commission, the immunity
typically accorded to high-ranking officials under domestic doctrine was an
expression of political self-interest which had no proper place in interna-
tional law.36 The commission explained that otherwise the "greatest
outrages against the laws and customs of war and the laws of humanity...
could in no circumstances be punished. Such a conclusion would shock the
conscience of civilized mankind."37
The vindication of the laws and customs of war and the laws of hu-
manity also would be incomplete absent the prosecution of the smallest as
well as the most substantial war criminals, including the ex-Kaiser.
3 8
Furthermore, the trial of offenders might be compromised in the event
that they were able to plead as a defense the superior orders of a sovereign
who, himself, was immunized from prosecution.39
Individuals were to be held accountable for affirmative acts as well as
for a failure to intervene.4 0 The commission, in explaining the rationale
underlying the decision to punish omissions, stressed that the Kaiser and
other civilian and military authorities were cognizant of and could have
mitigated the barbarities: a "word from them would have brought about a
different method in the action of their subordinates on land, at sea and in
the air."41
32. Id. at 118.
33. Id. at 113.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 116.
36. Commission on the Responsibility on the Authors of the War, supra note 30, at 116.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 117.
39. Id. The commission observed that the relevant court should determine whether the
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The commission proposed that war crimes affecting nationals of sev-
eral Allied countries should be tried before a multinational tribunal. 42 The
consent of the defeated belligerent states to this jurisdiction was to be
embodied in the treaty of peace.4 3
The American representatives, Robert Lansing and James Brown
Scott, in anticipating subsequent debates over the contours of command
responsibility, objected to the commission's initial formulation which
posited that civilian and military authorities should be liable for a failure to
act, regardless of their degree of knowledge or capacity to prevent the
commission of crimes.4 The Americans insisted that an official must have
been aware of the criminal acts and have possessed the authority and
power to prevent or to repress them; the duty or obligation to act was
essential.45 Lansing and Scott also stressed that the imposition of liability
on individuals who failed to act did not exonerate those who directly
engaged in the criminal conduct. 46 The United States representatives
further objected to the abrogation of sovereign immunity and to the
extension of liability to heads of states, arguing that the essence of
sovereignty was that a head of state was neither subject nor subordinated
to foreign control.
42. Commission on the Responsibility on the Authors of the War, supra note 30, at 121.
The commission observed as to offenses affecting a single country that every belligerent
possesses the prerogative under international law to prosecute individuals alleged to be
guilty of violations of the laws and customs of war. Id. There was a provision for
prosecuting individuals before an international tribunal in those instances in which it was
viewed as advisable given the character of the offense or the law of any belligerent country.
Id. at 121-22. The law to be applied shall be "the principles of the law of nations as they
result from the usages established among civilized peoples from the laws of humanity and
from the dictates of public conscience." Id. at 122.
43. Id. at 123.
44. Memorandum of Reservations Presented by the Representatives of the United States
to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities, annex II, supra note 30, at 127, 143.
45. Id. at 143.
46. Id.
47. !d. at 148. The United States representatives also objected to the imposition of liability
for violations of the laws of humanity since, according to the Americans, this constituted a
novel, varying and uncertain standard. Id. at 144. Lansing and Scott also opposed
international tribunals and advocated the creation of mixed tribunals which would be
limited to affected States; contending that States were not authorized to assume jurisdiction
over acts which did not fall within the traditional ambit of their international jurisdiction.
Id. at 147.
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48The Treaty of Peace with Germany, strained to preserve the sover-
eign immunity of the ex-Kaiser, holding him responsible for the heretofore
unknown "supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity
of treaties., 49 He was to be prosecuted before a special five judge
international tribunal which was to be guided by the "highest motives of
international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of
international undertakings and the validity of international morality." 50
The latter provision significantly omitted responsibility for war crimes."
Germany also recognized the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to
bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in
12
violation of the laws and customs of war. Individuals accused of criminal
acts against the nationals of a single Allied and Associated Power were to
be prosecuted before a military tribunal of that Power.53 Those charged
with criminal acts which affected the interests of more than one of the
Allied and Associated Powers were to be tried before military tribunals
comprised of representatives of the Powers concerned.
The Allied Powers developed a roster of 3,000 offenders which was
gradually winnowed to 854 serious cases of criminal conduct; this included
over eighty high-ranking civilian and military leaders.5 The Allied Powers
soon became convinced that conducting international trials would
destabilize the Weimar regime and risk revolutionary insurrection."' The
Germans ultimately were permitted to prosecute forty-five individuals
before the Penal Senate of the Supreme Court (Reichsgericht). 7 These
proceedings, for the most part, focused on lower-level combatants.5
9
The issue of command responsibility was presented in the prosecution
of Emil Muller.9 Muller was a captain in the army reserves who, between
April and May 1918, who commanded a prison camp in France which
48. Treaty of Peace with Germany, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 151 (Doc. Supp.) (1919).
49. Id. at 250, art. 227.




54. Treaty of Peace with Germany, supra note 48, at 251, art. 229.
55. JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG THE POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY OF
PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OFTHE FIRST WORLD WAR 119-20 (1982).
56. Id. at 124-28.
57. Id. at 130-31.
58. See Judgment in the Case of Karl Heynen (May 26, 1921), 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 674
(1922).
59. Judgment in the Case of Emil Muller (May 30, 1921), 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1922).
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housed English POWs.6° The camp was situated in a muddy unsanitary
marsh; there was inadequate food, water and sanitation and disease was
widespread.6' The accused sent several memos demanding supplies and
62
made ardent efforts to improve conditions. He managed to arrange for
medical treatment and, on his own initiative, succeeded in securing
additional food as well as sinking wells, installing stoves and latrines and
establishing disinfection stations to combat lice.
63
Muller was acquitted of willful neglect, the Court determining that he
was not responsible for these abominable conditions since "he had
perceived the danger in good time and had done everything to prevent
it.'64 In a relatively short period of time, Muller had accomplished an
"astonishing amount" towards improving his camp.65 Although he had not
completely eradicated disease and depredation, the Court stressed that this
was due to "circumstances which were beyond both him and also his
immediate superiors.
6
Muller also was charged with punishing prisoners by binding them toS 67
a post in violation of regulations. In two instances, internees were
tethered and secured so as to stare directly into the sun.6' The Court
determined that this had been carried out on the initiative of non-
commissioned officers without Muller's knowledge. 69 However, in another
instance, Muller witnessed a prisoner being harshly reprimanded by a
Sergeant-Major, made an unrecorded remark, and the soldier then
proceeded to fell the prisoner with his fist.70 The Court concluded that the
accused "at least tolerated and approved of this brutal treatment, even if it
was not done on his orders."71 Muller was convicted of the ill treatment of
72prisoners and subordinates and was sentenced to six months in prison.
By 1928, virtually all of the remaining charges against German com-
batants had been dismissed and those who had been imprisoned had been
60. Id. at 685.
61. Id. at 685-86.
62. Id. at 686.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 687.
65. Judgment in the Case of Emil Muller, supra note 59, at 687.
66. Id. at 687.
67. Id. at 689.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 691.
71. Judgment in the Case of Emil Muller, supra note 59, at 691.
72. Id. at 685.
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released. Several months following Hitler's ascendancy to power, the
prosecutor's office in Leipzig formally quashed all outstanding war crimes
proceedings. 3
In summary, the issue of command responsibility arose during the
debate over the prosecution of war crimes committed during World War I;
there was strong sentiment for holding military officials liable for failing to
intervene to halt war crimes.74 In the prosecution of Emil Muller, the
German Supreme Court followed the Commission on Responsibility and
held that a conviction under command responsibility required that the
accused had possessed the position, power, capacity and knowledge to halt
the crimes. 75 An official was obligated to undertake aggressive remedial
action, but was not required to fully ameliorate a situation which he,
himself, had not created.76
II. GENERAL YAMASHITA
Following World War II, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, the former
Japanese Supreme Commander in the Philippines, was charged, convicted
and sentenced to death by a United States military war crimes commission
which determined that he had failed to discharge his duty to control his
troops.77 This verdict was subsequently affirmed by the American Army
command,"' as well as by the United States Supreme Court. 7
The indictment alleged that as American forces invaded the Philip-
pines that Japanese troops under Yamashita's command fled in a rapid
retreat during which they committed numerous war crimes, including the
killing of non-combatants. s° The Japanese depredations enumerated in the
bill of particulars included the execution and massacre without trial of
73. WILLIS, supra note 55, at 146.
74. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying texts.
75. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying texts.
76. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying texts.
77. Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 1948 L. REP. WAR CRIM. 1, 35-37 (Oct. 8-Dec.
17, 1945).
78. General Headquarters United States Army Forces, Pacific Office of the Theater
Judge Advocate, Review of the Record of Trial by a Military Commission of Tomoyuki
Yamashita, General Japanese Army (Dec. 26, 1945), reprinted in COURTNEY WHITNEY,
THE CASE OF GENERAL YAMASHITA: A MEMORANDUM 60 (1950) hereinafter Review of
the Record].
79. In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945). See generally A.F. REEL, THE CASE OF GENERAL
YAMASHITA (1949).
80. Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, supra note 77, at 5.
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civilian internees and prisoners of war; the torture, rape and killing of
women, children and members of religious orders through starvation,
beheading, bayoneting, clubbing, hanging, immolation and the use of
explosives; and the demolition without military necessity of large numbers
of homes, businesses, places of religious worship, hospitals and educational
institutions.81
Twenty-five thousand civilians were alleged to have been killed in
Batangas Province, Luzon Island alone between October 1944 and May 1,
1945.82 Individuals were shot, bayoneted and buried alive.8 3 Three hundred
Filipinos were forced to leap into a well into which heavy weights were
dropped. Those who survived were executed. 4 In another incident, three
to four hundred civilians were bayoneted, shot, and immolated."'
Hundreds of women and young women were raped; their breasts and
sexual organs mutilated. Babies were thrown into the air and spitted on
bayonets; civilians were beaten, burned, hung by the limbs, blinded and
large quantities of water was forced through their mouth and nostrils.
86
Prisoners of war were forced to survive on a diet of cats, pigeons, and
rats. 7 Over fifteen hundred Americans were crowded into the cramped
cargo hold of a Japanese steamship and were starved and driven to
dementia; attacking one another and sucking their victims' blood."
Yamashita, in his defense, claimed that the roughly 240,000 troops
under his command had scattered in retreat and had lost communications
with headquarters. 9 Yamashita's capacity to direct his forces also was
impeded by the fact that his troops had been augmented by naval units
over whom he exercised only limited command and control.9 These troops
disregarded Yamashita's orders to flee Manila and, as the Americans
approached, destroyed large sections of the city. 91  Eight thousand
residents were killed and over seven thousand were mistreated, maimed
81. !d. at 4.
82. Id. at 5.




87. Id. at 69.
88. Id. at 69.
89. Review of the Record, supra note 78, at 72-73.
90. Id. at 72.
91. Id. at 73.
[Vols. 8.2 & 9.1
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY
and wounded during this orgy of violence; the bodies of the dead were
92
dumped into rivers, discarded in mass graves or immolated.
Yamashita contended that he neither ordered, authorized, tolerated
nor had known of the crimes and atrocities catalogued in the indictment 93
The prosecution, however, alleged that these crimes had been so
widespread, notorious and redundant that Yamashita must have been
aware of them and that any ignorance on his part was due to the fact that
he "'took affirmative action not to know."' 94
An American military commission stressed that Yamashita was an
officer with a prodigious palette of prior military experience. 95 The panel
noted that while a military commander possessed substantial power and
responsibility that it would be unfair to hold an official liable for every
murder and rape committed by combatants. 96 On the other hand,
commanders were ceded broad powers for administering justice in order to
maintain discipline and direction. 97 The commission, in balancing these
considerations, concluded that it would be appropriate to hold officers
criminally liable in those instances in which the catastrophic crimes of
combatants had been widespread and there had been no "effective
attempt" by a commander to "discover and control" this conduct. 98
The commission concluded that a systematic pattern of atrocities had
been committed by Japanese troops in the Philippine Islands and that
Yamashita had failed to establish the type of effective control which was
required under the circumstances. 99 He was sentenced to death by
hanging.'O'
A board of review was convened by General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces, Pacific.0 1 The
board determined that in light of the prodigious, prominent and persistent
nature of the offenses committed by Japanese forces that the "conclusion
is inevitable that the accused knew about them and either gave his tacit
92. Id. at 62.
93. Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, supra note 77, at 18.
94. Id. at 17.




99. Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, supra note 77, at 35.
100. Id.
101. Review of the Record, supra note 78, at 60.
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approval to them or at least failed to do anything either to prevent them or
to punish their perpetrators.,
102
The United States Supreme Court, in affirming Yamashita's convic-
tion, observed that unrestrained and unsupervised military operations
inevitably result in violations of humanitarian law, undermining the
protections afforded civilian populations and prisoners of war. 3 Accord-
ing to the majority, the central role of a commanding officer in protecting
civilians and wounded or captured enemy belligerents was proclaimed in
various international instruments which recognized that the violation of
the law of armed conflict "is to be avoided through the control of the
operations of war by commanders who are ... responsible for their
subordinates."104
The Court accordingly confirmed that a commanding officer pos-
sessed an "affirmative duty to take such measures as were within his power
and appropriate in the circumstances to protect prisoners of war and the
civilian population."1 5 The majority avoided the thorny factual issue of the
extent of Yamashita's knowledge of war crimes, holding that he was liable
regardless of whether he possessed actual or constructive knowledge or
was unaware of the atrocities committed by the Japanese troops; he had
the duty under any circumstances to issue orders and to take steps to
prevent violations of the law of war.' °6 The Court noted that the prophylac-
tic power of the humanitarian law of war "would largely be defeated if the
commander of an invading army could with impunity neglect to take
reasonable measures" to protect civilians and prisoners of war.
In dissent, Justice Frank Murphy contended that there was no prece-
dent under international law for the charge against Yamashita&
According to Murphy, in holding Yamashita culpable for the criminal
conduct of his subordinates, the Court had abrogated the principle of
individual responsibility; there was no evidence that Yamashita personally
participated in, ordered or condoned or was even aware of the atrocities.l 9
He was simply accused of the unprecedented offense of disregarding and
failing to discharge his duty to control his subordinates, thus permitting
102. Id.
103. Application of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 15 (1946).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 16.
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 28.
109. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28.
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them to commit crimes." ° Justice Murphy noted that this elastic principle
might someday result in the prosecution of the entire United States
military command, ranging from sergeants and generals to the President
and his advisors."' The verdict also risked further rupturing relations with
Japan: "To subject an enemy belligerent to an unfair trial, to charge him
with an unrecognized crime, to vent on him our retributive emotions only
antagonizes the enemy nation and hinders the reconciliation necessary to a
peaceful world."1
2
Murphy argued that Yamashita's conviction was particularly prob-
lematic given that the Japanese general's inability to control and
communicate with his troops was a consequence of the massive American
assault."' Yamashita's difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that he had
had assumed command over an organizationally deficient force which was
afflicted with defective equipment, supplies, training, discipline and
morale.1 4 This was exacerbated by the unanticipated assignment of naval
and air force units to Yamashita's tactical command. "' Murphy warned
that the trial of a vanquished commander for violating such speculative
and imprecise parameters created the potential for prosecutions based on
the pursuit of retribution and revenge rather than justice.'' 6
General Douglas MacArthur was the final reviewing authority and
ratified Yamashita's death sentence.1 7 MacArthur recalled that four days
following the landing of American forces that he had warned that he
would hold Japanese military authorities personally liable for the
inhumane and improper treatment of prisoners of war, civilian internees or
civilian non-combatants."S Yamashita had "failed his duty to his troops, to
his country, to his enemy to mankind; has failed utterly his soldierly
faith."' 19 MacArthur concluded that Yamashita's actions were a "blot upon
the military profession, a stain upon civilization and constitute a memory
of shame and dishonor that can never be forgotten."
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 28-29.
113. Id. at 34-35.
114. Id. at 33.
115. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 33,
116. Id. at 34.
117. Review of the Record, supra note 78, at 3.
118. Id. at 4-5.
119. Id. at 4.
120. Id.
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In summary, the Yamashita decision issued by the United States Su-
preme Court imposed an affirmative obligation upon commanding officers
to take prophylactic measures to prevent and to punish violations of the
humanitarian law of war. The details and context of this duty, however,
remained uncertain and ill defined.'2 In the end, the Court avoided the
thorny issue of the extent of Yamashita's knowledge and seemingly
punished him for his passivity, holding him strictly liable for failing to
anticipate and to take action to prevent and punish the widespread
commission of war crimes."
III. POST WORLD WAR II INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS:
NUREMBERG, TOKYO, CONTROL COUNCIL No. 10 AND RELATED
PROSECUTIONS
A. The Nuremberg Tribunal
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg addressed the
124
criminal culpability of twenty-two high-ranking Nazi leaders. 2 The Court
made the unprecedented proclamation that individuals possessed
international duties which transcended their national obligations.
12 5
Officials acting on behalf of the State, accordingly, may not cloak
themselves with sovereign immunity in the event that the State, "in
authorizing action, moves outside its competence under international
law." 12 6 This clearly meant that those in authority might be prosecuted for
authorizing, planning or participating in criminal conduct which was
contrary to international law, including the Nuremberg crimes of waging a
war of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity.
127
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying texts. The proper interpretation of the
Yamashita decision has been the subject of persistent debate. See William H. Parks,
Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 62 MIL. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1973); Crowe, supra
note 29, at 206-08.
124. See United States v. Hermann Goring, in TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, XXII 411 (1948) [hereinafter
Nuremberg Judgment].
125. Id. at 466.
126. Id.
127. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8,
1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
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The Tribunal implicitly invoked the doctrines of command responsi-
bility in several cases involving military as well as civilian officials, the
latter constituting an unprecedented extension of prevailing international
legal doctrine. 28 The defendants in these decisions were determined to
have been fully-apprised of the transgressions committed by their
subordinates. Wilhelm Frick was Minister of the Interior during the war.129
He exercised jurisdiction over nursing homes, hospitals and asylums in
which euthanasia was practiced.130 The Tribunal determined that Frick was
well-aware that "insane, sick and aged people" and "'useless eaters,"' were
being systematically put to death.' 3' He nevertheless disregarded popular
protests and the killings continued. 32 A report by the Czechoslovak War
Crimes Commission estimated that 275,000 "mentally deficient and aged
people" had been the victims of euthanasia.
131
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, in January 1943, was appointed Chief of the
Security Police and head of the Reich Security Head Office (RSHA). T As
Chief of the RSHA, Kaltenbrunner possessed authority to order protective
custody and to release detainees from concentration camps. 35 RSHA also
was responsible for transferring ideologically suspect Soviet prisoners of
war and Jews to concentration camps. 36 The Tribunal determined that
Kaltenbrunner was conversant with the conditions in the camps from his
visits to Mauthausen where he witnessed the execution of inmates.'37
Kaltenbrunner also was found to have been fully apprised of the
extermination of Jews by RSHA directed killing squads which were
138
responsible for the murder of as many as six million. Kaltenbrunner
explained that the organization's criminal conduct had been initiated prior
to his appointment, that he generally was unaware of RSHA's activities,
and that he had intervened to halt those atrocities which had been brought
to his attention. 39 The Court, however, concluded that Kaltenbrunner
128. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying texts.
129. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 124, at 544.
130. id. at 546.
131. Id. at 546-47.
132. Id. at 547.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 537.
135. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 124, at 537.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 538.
139. Id.
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"exercised control over the activities of the RSHA, was aware of the
crimes it [RSHA] was committing, and was an active participant in many
of them. 140 Fritz Saukel was Plenipotentiary General for the Utilization of
Labor. 14 The Tribunal determined that Saukel possessed "overall
responsibility for the slave labor program" and "was aware of [the]
ruthless methods being taken to obtain laborers and vigorously supported
them on the ground that they were necessary to fill the quotas.
14 1
Konstantin von Neurath was Reich Protector for Bohemia and Mora-
via.143 He drafted a memorandum which advocated the racial assimilation
of the majority of Czechs into Germany and proclaimed that resistance by
the intelligentsia and other groups would be met by expulsion.' 44 Von
Neurath, in his defense, contended that the implementation of this
repressive regime was the responsibility of the Security Police and was not
within his jurisdiction. In addition, he argued that the Germany's anti -
Semitic and economically exploitative policies were conceived and carried
out by authorities in the Reich.14 However, these arguments were not
deemed exonerating; the Tribunal noted that von Neurath had functioned
as "the chief German official in the Protectorate when the administration
of this territory played an important role in the wars of aggression which
Germany was waging in the East, knowing that war crimes and crimes
against humanity were being committed under his authority.', 47 The
Tribunal thus determined that von Neurath had knowingly presided over a
range of repressive and restrictive policies within his territorial command
which involved the abrogation of the freedoms of association, equality,
property, speech and fair trial.' 8 The Court recognized in mitigation that
von Neurath had attempted to gain the release of many of the Czechoslo-
vaks who had been detained, including student activists.1 49 He made efforts
140. Id.
141. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 124, at 566.
142. Id. at 566, 567. Hans Frank was Governor General of the occupied Polish territory.
The judgment suggested that Frank would not be held liable for the crimes committed by
the security police which were under the control of Hcnrich Himmler. The Tribunal noted
that many of these crimes were committed without the knowledge of Frank, and even
occasionally despite his opposition. Id. at 543.
143. Id. at 579-80.
144. Id. at 582.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 124, at 582.
148. See id
149. Id.
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to dissuade Hitler from adopting harsh occupation measures, attempted to
resign and, when unsuccessful, quietly took a leave of absence. 5 " Almost
two years later, von Neurath's resignation was formally accepted. I He was
sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, the most lenient sentence meted
out to any of the Nuremberg defendants. ,
2
The Nuremberg Tribunal thus implicitly applied the concept of com-
mand responsibility in convicting various defendants of war crimes and
crimes against humanity.1 3 The attribution of a wide-range of repressive
acts to a single individual, at times, seemed unduly harsh and unfair. 1
4
However, this was tempered by the Tribunal's tendency to limit individual
liability to acts over which the defendant possessed knowledge and
exercised direct or territorial authority.15 In many instances, the defendant
also was found to have encouraged or participated in these criminal acts. 1
6
Defendants also were considered culpable in those instances in which
criminal conduct reasonably could have been anticipated and they failed to
assert command and control.5 7 Individual guilt was mitigated in those
cases in which a defendant took firm and full steps to ameliorate the
Reich's draconian decrees and depredations.15 8 Nuremberg thus implicitly
retreated from the Yamashita strict liability standard and quietly embraced
the knowledge and authority standard.5 9 This test was more fully
developed in the trial of Japanese war criminals before the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East.
B. The Tokyo Tribunal
The Tokyo Tribunal initially addressed the mistreatment and security
of prisoners of war, arguing that governments were obligated under
customary and conventional law to insure that internees were free from
inhumane treatment. Military and civilian officials were under a duty to
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id. at 588-89.
153. See supra notes 129-51 and accompanying texts.
154. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 136-37 and 141-42 and accompanying texts.
158. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying texts.
159. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying texts.
160. International Military Tribunal for the Far East, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial (Nov.
1948), reprinted in THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 11 1029, 1038 (Leon
Friedman ed. 1972) [hereinafter Tokyo Tribunal].
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structure an efficient and effective system for monitoring and reporting on
the well-being of prisoners."'
Military and civilian officials, exercising direct authority over prison-
ers who possessed knowledge of mistreatment, or would have acquired
such knowledge but for their own negligence, indifference or indolence,
were obligated to "take such steps as were within their power to prevent
the commission of such crimes."' 62 In imputing knowledge, consideration
was to be given to factors such as whether the crimes were "notorious,
numerous and widespread as to time and place. 163 Cabinet officials could
not claim as a defense that they relied upon the assurances of individuals
with close control over prisoners in those instances in which the official
possessed an actual or constructive basis to make additional inquiries into
the veracity of these representations. 164
Authoritative military and civilian officials also were under a duty to
anticipate the possible mistreatment of prisoners. 5 They were held
responsible for crimes committed against internees under their control in
those instances in which they knew or should have known in advance of
these delicts and were obligated to take "adequate steps" to prevent the
166
commission of such crimes in the future.
The Japanese Cabinet was considered collectively responsible for the
continuing care of internees. 167 Cabinet members, with knowledge of the ill
treatment of prisoners, who lacked authority to curb such crimes were not
immune from liability.' 8 The preferred path was resignation; those who
voluntarily remained were criminally culpable for any future mistreat-
ment.
169
Administrative officials below the cabinet rank responsible for admin-
istering the system for protecting prisoners of war, who possessed, or
should have possessed, knowledge of abuse and who failed to take
"effective" action to the "extent of their powers" were liable for future
161. Id. at 1038-39.
162. Id. at 1039. The Tribunal imposed liability on an individual whose office "required or
permitted him to take any action to prevent such crimes." Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. Relevant factors include the position of the individual offering the assurance and
the frequency of reports of criminal misconduct towards prisoners. Id.
165. Id
166. Tokyo Tribunal, supra note 160, at 1039.
167. Id, at 1039.
168. Id.
169. Id.
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acts of criminal conduct.70 Lower-level personnel in unrelated administra-
tive units who possessed knowledge of the ill treatment of prisoners were
not required to take action or to resign. '
In summary, the requisite criminal intent was established in those
instances in which an individual occupying an authoritative position
possessed actual or constructive knowledge or, but for their own
negligence, would have possessed knowledge of war crimes, and failed to
prevent or to punish the delicts"' This clarified that civilian as well as
military officials were responsible for both condemning and controlling
acts in contravention of the code of conflict. 173 The Tribunal also made a
significant innovation in holding various cabinet officials and lower-level
administrators criminally culpable who remained in office despite their
awareness of the mistreatment of prisoners. 74 The former was posited on
the Court's contention that cabinet officials were collectively concerned
with the safety and security of detainees.17 The Tribunal failed to
completely clarify the scope of required remedial action. There, however,
was language suggesting that individuals were required to take such
reasonable steps as were within their formal and informal powers.176
The Tokyo Tribunal thus substituted an actual and constructive
knowledge and indifference test for the Yamashita strict liability
standard.' The Court imputed knowledge to Kuniaki Koiso, who was
appointed Prime Minister in 1944.178 The Tribunal noted that the atrocities
and other war crimes committed by Japanese troops in every theater of
war were so "notorious" that it was "improbable" that Koiso would not
have been aware of these events by reason of their notoriety or as a result
of inter-departmental communications. 7 9 The judges found it particularly
significant that Koiso attended a meeting of the Supreme Council for the
Direction of War, in October 1944, at which the Foreign Minister reported
that information from enemy sources indicated "that the Japanese
170. Id. at 1039-40.
171. Id. at 1039.
172. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
173. See id.
174. See supra notes 168-70 and accompanying texts.
175. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 105-07, 162-64 and accompanying texts.
178. Tokyo Tribunal, supra note 160, at 1141.
179. Id.
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treatment of prisoners of war 'left much to be desired.'"' 8" Koiso
nevertheless remained in office for an additional six months during which
prisoners and internees continued to be mistreated."" The Tribunal
determined that this constituted a "deliberate disregard of his duty."'8'2
The Court adopted a similar analysis in convicting Shunroko Hata,
commander of the expeditionary forces in China8 3 The judges noted that
the large-scale atrocities had been committed over a lengthy period of time
by troops under his commandl&4 Hata was determined either to have
known of these delicts and to have taken no steps to prevent them, or to
have been "indifferent" and to have "made no provision for learning
whether orders for the humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilians"
were being implemented."8 In contrast, Shimada Shigetaro, Naval Minister
in the Tojo Cabinet between 1941 and 1944, was acquitted.186 He was
determined to have neither ordered, authorized, permitted nor known of
the murder of prisoners of war and survivors of torpedoed ships in the
Pacific.187
In addition, the Tokyo Court clarified that a government official with
knowledge of war crimes possessed a duty to take appropriate ameliora-
tive action. Hidecki Tojo was named Minister of War in 1940, and
subsequently was appointed Prime Minister, in October 1941, a position he
held until July 1944.188 The Tribunal concluded that Tojo was well aware of
the mistreatment of prisoners of war and yet took no "adequate steps" to
punish offenders or to "prevent the commission of similar offenses in the
future."'' 9 Although he was aware, in 1942, of the brutal Bataan Death
March, Tojo nevertheless neglected to demand an investigation, only
undertook a superficial survey, and failed to punish the troops involved."90
The Tribunal was not persuaded by Tojo's claim that Japanese command-
ers in the field were not subject to specific orders from Tokyo and




183. Id. at 1131.
184. Tokyo Tribunal, supra note 160, at 1131.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1149.
187. Id. at 1149-50.
188. Id, at 1153.
189. Id. at 1154.
190. Tokyo Tribunal, supra note 160, at 1154.
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willfully refused to perform the duty which lay upon that Government of
enforcing performance of the Laws of War."'91
Tojo also advised that prisoners of war should be deployed in "the
construction of the Burma-Siam Railway.' ' 92 Yet, he failed to make proper
provisions for billeting, food or hygiene. t93 Tojo responded to accounts of
deteriorating conditions by assigning an officer to investigate. 94 The Prime
Minister's only reaction to the report was to subject a company com-
mander to trial.195 As a result of Tojo's indifference and inaction, the Court
concluded that "[d]eficiency, diseases and starvation continued to kill off
the prisoners until the end of the project."' 96 The Prime Minister was aware
of these dramatic death rates; they were discussed at conferences over
which he presided. 97 The Tribunal concluded that the continuation of
these corrosive conditions and the numerous prisoners who died from a
lack of food and medicine constituted "conclusive proof' that Tojo had
failed to take "proper steps to care for them.,
19
All reasonable available avenues of redress were to be exhausted.
Seishiro Itagaki, in April 1945, was appointed commander of the Seventh
- •199
Army headquartered in Singapore. The conditions in prisoner of war
camps were catastrophic. 2 Itagaki explained in his defense that Allied
attacks on Japanese shipping made the transportation of supplies difficult
and that he was compelled to preserve provisions so that they would
persist throughout the war.20' The Tribunal, however, ruled that Itagaki





195. Id. at 1154-55.
196. Tokyo Tribunal, supra note 160, at 1155.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1155. Tojo also knew and approved of the "shocking attitude" that Chinese
prisoners of war were not entitled to the status of prisoners of war. Id. Akira Muto was an
officer on the staff of Iwane Matsui, who was in charge of the troops which occupied
Nanking. Muto was found to have known of the atrocities, but as a result of his subordinate
position was determined to have been powerless to prevent them. Id. at 1144. A related
decision with a similar rationale was issued in acquitting Kenryo Sato of war crimes in
China. Id. at 1146-47.
199. Id. at 1135.
200. Id. at 1136.
201. Id. at 1137.
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superiors to provide for the prisoners.2 0 2 His rationale, in the view of the
judges, amounted to a justification for "treating the prisoners and
internees with gross inhumanity., 20 3 The Tribunal concluded that it could
not condone a course of conduct which had resulted in the "death or
sufferings of thousands of people whose adequate maintenance was his
[Itagaki's] duty."200
Mamoru Shigemitsu was appointed Foreign Minister in 1943. His
office received a series of protests from foreign countries concerning the
mistreatment of prisoners of war. 2" The military rebuffed requests from
outside powers to inspect the camps, arrange interviews with prisoners and
2071
to obtain the names of internees. Shigemitsu nevertheless took "no
adequate steps to have the matter investigated., 20 8 The Tribunal ruled that
he "should have pressed the matter, if necessary to the point of resigning,
in order to quit himself of a responsibility which he suspected was not
being discharged. '" 2°9
The Tribunal's third conceptual contribution was to rule, in the case
of Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, that an official who receives assurances
that criminal conduct will be curtailed may not disregard reports that the
210delicts continue. Japanese troops, in December 1937, occupied Nanking
and almost immediately executed an estimated twelve thousand non-
combatants and raped roughly twenty thousand women.2 The death toll
in the first six weeks reached two hundred thousand.2 12 Foreign Minister
Koki Hirota learned of the atrocities through diplomatic documents and
accepted assurances from the War Ministry that the brutalities would be
curtailed."' He nevertheless continued to receive reports of these excesses
202. Tokyo Tribunal, supra note 160, at 1137.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1147.
206. Id. at 1148.
207. Id.
208. Tokyo Tribunal, supra note 160, at 1148.
209. Id. at 1148-49. Shigenori Tojo, as Foreign Minister, "endeavored" to insure the
observance of the law of war. He passed on protests to the proper authorities and, in some
instances, remedial measures were taken. The Tribunal failed to find "sufficient proof of
Togo's neglect of duty in connection with -war crimes." Id. at 1153.
210. Id. at 1132.
211. Id. at 1061.
212. Id at 1062.
213. Id. at 1134.
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over the next month.2 4 The Tribunal ruled that Hirota was derelict in
failing to take "immediate action," including demanding that the Cabinet
expeditiously end the atrocities .2" He instead was content to rely on
representations which he knew from reports were not being implemented
while hundreds of murders, sexual assaults and atrocities were being
committed: this "amounted to criminal negligence.""21 The extension of
liability to Hirota was particularly significant since he exercised influence
rather than formal authority over the military. 1
7
Finally, an official who orders a halt to criminal conduct has a duty to
ensure compliance with his commands. Heitaro Kimura assumed the
position of Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Area Army, with
knowledge that atrocities were being committed in all military theaters.
Although Kimura admonished his troops to demonstrate respect for
prisoners, the atrocities continued, in many cases on a large-scale within a
219. 20few miles of his headquarters. Yet, he took no steps to curb the crimes. 2°
The Tribunal ruled that Kimura deliberately disregarded his legal duty to
take adequate steps to prevent breaches of the laws of war and failed to
insure that these commands were implemented."'
The Tokyo Tribunal provided the first extended exposition of com-
mand responsibility. The Court held that civilian and military officials were
legally liable in those instances in which they actually or constructively
knew or, but for their own disregard or gross negligence, would have
222known of war crimes committed by those under their command. In such
instances, officials possessed a responsibility to exercise energetic
ameliorative formal and informal action to remedy the situation. 22' The
Court took the unprecedented step of imposing a responsibility on cabinet
officials who satisfied the intent requirement to resign rather than to
continue in office and countenance callousness towards prisoners, despite
214. Tokyo Tribunal, supra note 160, at 1134.
215. Id.
216. Id. lwane Matsui was Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army, which
included the Shanghai Expeditionary force and the Tenth Army, which occupied Nanking.
He was convicted of war crimes. The Tribunal determined that Matsui was aware of the
atrocities and failed to discharge his duty. Id. at 1142.
217. See id. at 1132-33. See also supra notes 206-09 and accompanying texts.
218. Tokyo Tribunal, supra notes 160, at 1139.
219. Id. at 1140.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 1140.
222. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 199-209 and accompanying texts.
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the fact that this was outside their scope of authority.224 A cabinet official,
with formal authority or informal influence, who received assurances that
criminal conduct will be curtailed incurred legal liability for disregarding
reports that the crimes continued. 225 Lastly, a civilian or military leader
possessed the obligation to ensure that troops complied with commands to
protect prisoners of war. " The Tribunal imposed responsibility on officials
to take such steps as were within their power to prevent the continuation
of crimes.22 This was interpreted to include the obligation to go beyond
the formal scope of an official's authority and to utilize informal influence
228
and personal persuasion z.
C. Prosecutions Under Control Council Law No. 10
Various subsidiary Nazi war criminals were brought to trial by the
Allied Powers under Control Council Law No. 10, which was drafted to
provide a uniform basis and procedure for the Allied Powers' prosecutionS • 22923
of alleged Nazi war criminals. The decisions in the Hostage 23 and High
Command cases clarified that the Yamashita strict liability standard
224. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying texts.
225. See supra notes 210-21 and accompanying texts.
226. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying texts. In 1949, an American military
tribunal acquitted Admiral Soeumu Toyoda of disregarding his duty to prevent war crimes,
most of which had been enumerated in the Yamashita judgment. See Parks, supra note 123,
at 69. Toyoda served as Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Combined Fleet, the
Combined Naval forces and the Naval Escort Command and was acquitted by an American
military tribunal of disregard of his duty to prevent war crimes, The judges followed the
Tokyo Court in establishing an actual or constructive knowledge or negligence standard,
An officer, according to the Tribunal, was liable if he knew or should have known through
the exercise of ordinary diligence of the commission of war crimes by his troops and he "did
not do everything within his power and capacity under the existing circumstances to
prevent their occurrence and to punish the offenders." See id. at 73 quoting United States v.
Soemu Toyoda 5006 (1949) (official transcript of record of trial).
227. See supra notes 162, 165-66, 188-89 and accompanying texts.
228. See supra notes 208-09, 215-16 and accompanying texts.
229. Control Council Law No. 10, reprinted in VI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, XVIII (1952).
230. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, XI, 1230 (1950) (discussing United States v. Wilhelm List
ct al.) [hereinafter Hostage Judgment].
231. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, XI, 462 (1950) (discussing United States v. Wilhelm von
Leeb) [hereinafter High Command Judgment].
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would not be extended to territorial commanders and elaborated on the
duty of these officials.232
In the Hostage case, an American Tribunal ruled that the command-
ing general of occupied territory possessed both executive and military
authority and was charged with maintaining security and stability. 233 He
was accountable for the conduct of all units within the scope of his
territorial jurisdiction, regardless of whether they were within his direct
chain of command.3 In contrast to tactical commanders whose responsi-
bility was premised on a unit's subordination within the chain of command,
the liability of a territorial commander was based on the scope of his or her
geographic authority.235
The Court explicitly rejected the defense that certain SS (Die
Schutzstaffeln der National Soczialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei; the
political and criminal police) units under the command of Heinrich
Himmler had committed atrocities without the knowledge, consent or
approval of the high-ranking military defendants .2 6 The panel stressed that
the "prevention of crime" was vested in territorial commanders and that
these officers may not "ignore obvious facts" and plead a lack of
knowledge as a defense."' For instance, the activities of the SS-the
plunder of property, internment of innocents and the systematic murder
and subjection of the population to slave labor-were recorded in the
reports of subordinate units."' Military commanders were considered to
possess constructive knowledge of reports received at their headquarters,
these typically being specifically intended for their inspection.239 Officers
were authorized to require reports of all events that fell within the scope of
their command and, if such transmissions were incomplete or inadequate,
they were obligated to request supplementary information; a failure to
obtain comprehensive and accurate data constituted a dereliction of
duty.
240
232. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying texts.
233. Hostage Judgment, supra note 230, at 1256.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1260.
236. Id. at 1256.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Hostage Judgment, supra note 230, at 1260.
240. Id. at 1271. In the case of the German army (Wehrmacht), the Court noted that there
was smooth and swift communication by telegraph, telephone, radio and courier and that
units were required to submit regular reports. Id. at 1259.
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Absence from headquarters was not a defense in those instances in
which a military official instituted or acquiesced in a policy. T4 A com-
mander, however, was not liable for orders issued in his absence which
242diverged from established practices.. However, time and circumstances
permitting, a territorial commander was required to rescind or to impede
these directives or, at a minimum, to prevent their recurrence. 243 The Court
also limited a commander's liability for unanticipated "emergent" events
other than in those instances in which the official neglected to act or had
approved a course of action which condoned the criminal conduct.
244
The Tribunal elaborated on the duty of territorial commanders in
convicting Field Marshal Wilhelm List, the fifth ranking field marshal in
245the Reich and Commander of German forces in Greece and Yugoslavia.
List conveyed orders issued by Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the
High Command of the Armed Forces, which required executing the fixed
figure of one hundred hostages in reprisal for the killing of a single
246German soldier. The Tribunal determined that this order was based on a
desire for revenge rather than as a deterrent to future illegal acts.14' The
number of hostages killed, in any event, was not calibrated to the character
and nature of the civilian attack and there was no indication that the
248hostages to be executed were aligned with the partisan forces. This, in
the view of the Tribunal, was "nothing less than plain murder.",
249
List's absence from headquarters did not relieve him of responsibility
for the thousands of unlawful reprisal killings carried out in accordance
with these orders.2 10 The executions were memorialized in reports received
by List)' Yet, he failed to prevent or to punish the killings. Instead, he
"complacently permitted thousands of innocent people to die before the
execution squads of the Wehrmacht and other armed units operating in the
territory. ' '152 List was obligated to assure the protection of people and
241. Id. at 1271. The defendants were absent for various reasons, including visitations to
the command area, vacation leaves and due to illness. Id. at 1259.
242. Id. at 1271.
243. Id.
244. id. at 1260.
245. Hostage Judgment, supra note 230, at 1262-63.
246. Id. at 1269. See also id. at 1264.
247, Id. at 1270.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1271.
251. Hostage Judgment, supra note 230, at 1271.
252. ld. at 1272.
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property within his territorial command and could not avoid responsibility
by citing his lack of tactical authority over various units.2 5
Defendant Hermann Foertsch was chief of staff under List. Foertsch
signed and distributed orders on List's behalf, received reports document-
ing the execution of reprisal prisoners, and served as List's primary
advisor. He was fully apprised of the application of the illegal reprisal
ratio, the deportation of Jews to concentration camps and the plunder of
256property. Foertsch was acquitted on the grounds that he lacked
command authority; mere knowledge of unlawful acts failed to satisfy the
strictures of criminal law.2 7
Defendant Walter Kuntze was appointed Deputy Armed Forces
218Commander Southeast in October 1941. Shortly after assuming
command, he received reports that his troops were detaining, decimating
and deporting Jews. 9 Yet, Kuntze "acquiesced in their performance when
his duty was to intervene to prevent their recurrence. 2 60 The Court
recognized that Kuntze protested and resisted the harsh measures
instituted by his superiors and that many of the crimes committed within
his command were implemented on the orders of Berlin. 26 ' The Tribunal
also was sympathetic to the challenge confronting a commander engaged
in combating partisan warfare.161 Yet, the judges noted that Kuntze was a
professional soldier of forty years experience who doubtlessly compre-
hended, or should have been clearly cognizant, that killing thousands
under the guise of acts of reprisal and the collection and concentration of
213Jews and Gypsies contravened the code of armed conflict. These acts
were recorded in reports transmitted to him as Armed Forces Commander
Southeast: Kuntze, simply "cannot close his eyes to what is going on
around him and claim immunity from punishment because he did not
know that which he is obliged to know."264
253. Id. at 1272.
254. Id. at 1281.
255. Id. at 1281-82.
256. Id. at 1284.
257. Hostage Judgment, supra note 230, at 1286.
258. Id. at 1274.
259. Id. at 1279.
260. Id. at 1280.
261. Id. at 1280.
262. Id.
263. Hostage Judgment, supra note 230, at 1281.
264. Id.
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Defendant Hubert Lanz was commander of the XXII Mountain
Corps in Greece .2 His troops engaged in acts of reprisal against innocent
villagers which were disproportionate to the provocation and, in the view
of the Tribunal, only could be explained as acts of vengeance. 66 These
were meticulously recorded in reports received by Lanz's headquarters. 67
Lanz's explanation that as a tactical commander that he had been too
preoccupied to halt the illegal reprisals was dismissed as a "lame
excuse." Lanz, although fully informed of these executions, "did
absolutely nothing about it." '69 This clearly violated his duty and contrib-
uted to the continuance of this practice of "inhumane and unlawful
killings." 270
In sum, the Hostage case established that territorial commanders were
responsible for knowingly failing to make an effort to halt, prevent and
punish the criminal conduct of troops within and outside of their chain of
command." The Tribunal also charged a commander with constructive
knowledge of the content of reports conveyed to his headquarters."Ab-
sence and the constraints of time and resources were not recognized as
defenses.
2 73
The High Command decision followed the Hostage case in recogniz-
ing that a territorial commander was endowed with executive authority
and, absent a directive limiting his executive powers, was obligated to
maintain order and to protect the civilian population.274
The Court followed the Hostage decision in stressing that command
culpability was premised on personal dereliction."' According to the
Tribunal, this required that the criminal conduct of subordinates was
directly traceable to a commander or resulted from the officer's wanton or
276immoral disregard or acquiescence. A more expansive standard would
contradict the basic principles of criminal law recognized by civilized
265. Id. at 1310.
266. ld. at 1311.
267. Id. at 1310-11.
268. Id. at 1311.
269. Hostage Judgment, supra note 230, at 1311.
270. Id.
271. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying texts.
272. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying texts.
273. See supra notes 250, 264 and accompanying texts.
274. See High Command Judgment supra note 231, at 544.
275. Id. at 543.
276. Id.
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nations.2" The Tribunal illustrated this limiting principle by noting that
military officers were not obligated to affirmatively investigate and might
rightfully and reasonably assume, in the absence of information to the
contrary, that their subordinates were properly and prudently implement-
278ing military plans and programs.
The Tribunal restricted the application of the Hostage decision and
resisted imputing knowledge to territorial commanders based upon the
size and scale of the atrocities committed by the Einsatzgruppen (policeS • 279
killing squads) and the ease of communication. The panel pointed out
that, in many instances, that the executions were far removed from military
headquarters, that there was limited contact between the police units
involved and high-ranking military officers, and that reports had been
routed through the security police in Berlin rather than military chan-
nels. 80 The intelligence services also were able to conceal the Reich's role
in the execution of Jews by organizing and orchestrating the localS 281
population to carry out pogroms and ethnic persecutions. The Court thus
refused to draw a general presumption concerning the scope of the
knowledge of territorial commanders and, instead, concluded that it was
282
necessary to examine the evidence pertaining to each defendant.
Georg Karl Friedrich-Wihelm von Kuechler was appointed Com-
mander of Army Group North in 1942.283 He allegedly opposed, but
nevertheless distributed, the Commissar Order, which required the
summary execution of captured political officers attached to Russian
troops.2g4 Although subordinate units submitted reports documenting the
execution of commissars, Kuechler denied knowledge of the killings.u5 The
Tribunal, however, followed the decision in the Hostage case 2"' and
concluded that"[i]t was his [Kuechler's] business to know, and we cannot
believe that the members of his staff would not have called these reports to
277. Id. at 544. A contrary interpretation would result in the President of the United States
being charged with criminality resulting from the conduct of United States troops. Id. at
543.
278. Id. at 543.
279. Id. at 547. Roughly 90,000 were liquidated in the area of the 11th Army; 40,000 were
liquidated in Riga within the area of the Army Group North. 1d.
280. High Command Judgment supra note 231, at 547-48.
281. Id. at 548.
282. Id. at 549.
283. Id. at 566.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 567.
286. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
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his attention had he announced his opposition to the order. 2 87 The Court
noted that the fact that expressions of overt opposition may have resulted
in retribution was not a defense, but might be considered in mitigation.
Once having acquired knowledge of the criminal activity of a unit
subordinate to an outside command, as suggested in the Hostage decision,
a territorial commander possessed the duty to energetically and effectively
intervene. Henry Hoth, was Commander of the "17th Army attached to
Army Group South., 290 He was apprised, in December 1941, that a police
killing squad had executed roughly 1,300 individuals within Hoth's
territorial command.29 1 His Chief-of-Staff, pursuant to Hoth's directive,
12issued an order suspending the operations of these units. The evidence
indicated that Hoth failed to take additional steps to monitor the matter
and that his troops continued to transfer prisoners and Jews to the security
police.9 The Tribunal concluded that Hoth possessed "executive power"
294
and the concomitant duty to protect the civilian population. Despite his
knowledge of the "character and functions of the SD (security police), his
possession of the power to curb them and his duty to do so, he washed his
hands of his responsibility and let the SD take its unrestrained course in his
area of command." 295
Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb was commander of Army Group
North with operational authority over five to six thousand soldiers.'" The
complexity of this command necessitated vesting executive administrative
authority in subordinate officers; von Leeb was not involved in daily
decisions, but exercised the prerogative to intervene to implement or to
adjust policy initiatives. 297 Authorities in Berlin directly issued the
Commissar Order to von Leeb's subsidiary field units.29" Despite von
Leeb's vocal opposition, this directive was vigorously implemented by his
subordinates.9 Von Leeb was acquitted: "He [von Leeb] did not
287. See High Command Judgment, supra note 231, at 567.
288. Id.
289. See supra notes 252-53, 260-61, 269-70 and accompanying texts.
290. High Command Judgment, supra note 231, at 581.
291. Id. at 595.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 596.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. High Command Judgment, supra note 231, at 553-55.
297. Id. at 554.
298. Id. at 557-58.
299. Id. at 557.
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disseminate the order. He protested against it and opposed it in every way
short of open and defiant refusal to obey it. If his subordinate commanders
disseminated it and permitted the enforcement, that is their responsibility
and not his." '
Prisoners of war within Field Marshal Wilhem von Leeb's territorial
command of Army Group North were under the supervision of the
quartermaster general who was directly responsible to the central
command of the armed forces. The quartermaster, in turn, was
authorized to exercise control over field officers subordinate to von
Leeb. 3°2 The Tribunal ruled that there was no evidence that the illegal use
of prisoners in dangerous occupations or locations was brought to von
Leeb's attention; he had the right to assume that his officers were properly
performing their assignments. 03 In addition, the Court observed that the
pathetic plight of the prisoners encountered by von Leeb might well have
stemmed from their condition when captured rather than from abuse by
their captors.304
Von Leeb also was determined to have been unaware of the activities
of the killing squads within his territorial command.05 Reports recording
exterminations either were ambiguous and uncertain as to time and place
or were not forwarded to von Leeb's command.'06 Only the murder of forty
thousand at Kovno (Riga) was indisputably brought to his attention, and
this was attributed to a local Latvian self-defense organization.07 Von
Leeb fulfilled his duty by affirmatively acting to prevent a recurrence of
such incidents.3°0 The Tribunal thus concluded that von Leeb had not been
apprised that killing squads were carrying out exterminations and, as a
result, he was not determined to have acquiesced in the kilhngs.
In summary, the Tribunal in the High Command presumed that, in
the absence of limiting legal authority, that a territorial commander was
legally responsible for maintaining safety and security throughout the
300. Id. at 557-58.
301. Id. at 558.
302. High Command Judgment, supra note 231, at 558.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 559.
305, Id. at 562.
306. Id. at 561-62.
307. Id. at 562.
308. High Command Judgment, supra note 231, at 562.
309. Id. at 561-62. Von Leeb, however, was found guilty of distributing the Barbaossa
Jurisdiction Order, which condoned the killing of civilians suspected of guerilla activity. Id.
at 560.
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scope of his territorial command.31 ° Knowledge was established by direct
information,3 ' the receipt of reports' or through the dissemination or
awareness of facially illegal orders.1 3 Liability arose in those instances in
which an official either intentionally or grossly and wantonly failed to
address evidence of criminal conduct; a mere failure to make reasonable
inquiries or to take precautions was not sufficient.1 Territorial command-
ers had the right to assume that their troops were acting legally and were
• • 311
not required to make inquiries. Officials were not presumed to possess
knowledge of all events within their territorial command, even acts
316
amounting to notorious and systematic extermination.
Other Control Council Law No. 10 judgments applied and extended
the core components of the law of command responsibility to novel factual
settings. An American Tribunal in the Medical case determined that
defendant Karl Brandt, Reich Commissioner for Medical and Health
Services, failed to fulfill his duty to monitor medical experiments. 17 Brandt
received reports and attended meetings describing sulfanilamide
experiments in which seventy-five persons had been intentionally and
involuntarily infected and treated with various anti-infectious compounds;/. 1318
three of the subjects reportedly died. Brandt neither objected, investi-
gated nor made an effort to halt the experiments.3 ' 9 The Tribunal
determined that had Brandt made the slightest investigation he would
have determined that these protocols were being conducted on non-
German nationals interned in concentration camps and that similar
experiments were planned in the future.3 0
Brandt also headed the euthanasia program.321 He conceded that this
involved the extermination of so-called "incurables," but testified that he
delegated responsibility to a subordinate and was unaware that this policy
310. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 306 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 285 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 284, 298 and accompanying texts.
314. See supra notes 275-78 and accompanying texts.
315. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
316. See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying texts.
317. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 I1, 171, 190-91, 193-94 (1950) (discussing United States v.
Brandt) [hereinafter Brandtl.
318. Id. at 193.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 196.
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322
was subsequently extended to Jews and to other non-German internees.
The Tribunal ruled that Brandt's failure to investigate the euthanasia
program constituted a grave breach of his duty and resulted in the
extermination of innocents: "whatever may have been the original aim of
the program, its purposes were prostituted by men for whom Brandt was
responsible, and great numbers of non-German nationals were extermi-
nated under its authority.'33
Other civilian officials also were held liable under the doctrine of
command responsibility. Hermann Roechling, Chair of the Reich
Association Iron and General Director of the Stahlwerke Voelklingen
steel works, was convicted by a French military court of war crimes. 3 4 He
was determined to have been central in urging the conscription and
deportation of involuntary foreign workers.12' The French Court concluded
that Roechling possessed a continuing duty to remain informed of the
326treatment of these deportees.
Roechling and the other members of the directorate of the Roechling
firm relied on the Gestapo to discipline workers in their factories who
were subjected to beatings, abuse and starvation."' Roechling inspected
the plants on various occasions and could not have failed to notice the
plight of workers.128 The Tribunal ruled that Roechling, as chief of the
Voelklingen plants and Chair of the Reich Association Iron, possessed
sufficient authority to intervene and to improve the plight of workers,
despite the fact that he lacked the legal position to completely curb their
mistreatment.329 Roechling and the other accused executives thus were
determined to have permitted and supported this "horrible treatment" and
were convicted of not "having done their utmost to put an end to these
abuses."
30
322. Id. at 197.
323. Brandt, supra note 317, at 197. The Tribunal noted that at the outset of the program
that euthanasia was practiced against non-Germans. Id.
324. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, XIV, 1097, 1133, 1140 (1952) (discussing France v.
Hermann Roechling et al.) [hereinafter Roechling].
325. Id. at 1132.
326. Id. at 1136.
327. Id. at 1135.
328. Id. at 1136.
329. Id.
330. Rocchling, supra note 324, at 1136. For an additional case involving the imposition of
command responsibility on industrialists, see TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, VI, 1187, 1202
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The rulings in Brandt and Roechling affirmed the continuing respon-
sibility of high-level civilian administrators to monitor the implementation
331
of programs and to actively intervene to prevent and to punish abuses.
Roechling stands as a case in which a duty was placed on a defendant to
332
utilize informal power and authority.
The application of command responsibility under Control Council No.
10 remained unpredictable and was tailored to the facts of particular cases.
At times, Courts seemed to strain to exonerate defendants of this charge."'
An American Tribunal determined that Field Marshal Erhard Milch,
Under State Secretary of the Reich Air Ministry and Inspector General
and Second in Command of the Luftwaffe, was unaware that high altitude
and freezing experiments involved the involuntary participation of
concentration camp inmates.334 The Tribunal determined that Milch
neither received the reports nor attended the conferences at which these
protocols were discussed and that he had believed that the experiments
had been terminated.33 As a result of his responsibilities in insuring a
steady supply of labor and material for the manufacture of aircraft, the
Court concluded that Milch was unable to devote himself to monitoring a
range of activities, including the high altitude and freezing experiments.336
The Tribunal stressed that the experiments had been conducted by
personnel "far removed from the immediate scrutiny of the defendant." 37
The Tribunal thus excused Milch's failure to satisfy the scope of his
supervisory position in the Luftwaffe and absolved him of responsibility,
noting that the experiments "engaged the attention of the defendant only
perfunctorily, if at all.
3 8
(1952) (discussing United States v. Friedrich Flick) (conviction for knowingly approving
procurement of prisoners of war).
331. See supra notes 318-23, 327-30 and accompanying texts.
332. See supra notes 333-36 and accompanying texts.
333. For other decisions involving command responsibility, see TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10,
V, 958 (1950) (discussing United States v. Oswald Pohl). See also id. at 992 (discussing
August Frank), 1011 (discussing Erwin Tschentscher), and 1055 (discussing Karl
Mummenthey).
334. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, II, 773, 774-75 (1949) (discussing United States v. Erhard
Milch).
335. Id. at 777-78.
336. Id. at 776.
337. Id. at 775.
338. Id. at 776.
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Three members of the I.G. Farben industrial firm were board mem-
bers in the Degesch firm in which Farben possessed a forty percent
interest.339 The board, including defendants Wilhelm Mann, Heinrich
Hoerlein and Karl Wurster, approved Degesch's sale of Cyclon-B gas.34
The Tribunal further ruled that neither the volume of production nor the
fact that large shipments were destined for concentration camps was
sufficient to place the board of directors on notice that the gas was being
used to exterminate inmates.34 In addition, the meetings of the board were
infrequent and the reports were sketchy and unenlightening. 342 The Court
concluded that the defendants may have reasonably believed that the gas
was being used to disinfect displaced persons in the congested concentra-
tion camps.343
In summary, the primary contribution of the Control Council No. 10
cases was to extend the doctrine of command responsibility to territorial
commanders.3 " Military and civilian officials were held responsible for
insuring lawful conduct within their territorial command by subordinate
units as well as by those outside their chain of command .14' The strict
liability test for territorial commanders was abandoned in favor of the
knowing or gross negligence standard.346 Courts resisted presuming
347knowledge and examined the facts in each case. Actual knowledge was
difficult to establish absent reports 348 and courts were inconsistent in their
application of the constructive knowledge standard; this may have
339. TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, VIII, 1081, 1168-69 (1950) (discussing United States v.
Karl Krauch).
340. ld.
341. Id. at 1169.
342. Id.
343. Id. The manager of Degesch, Doctor Gerhard Peters, was informed that Cyclon-B gas
was being used to exterminate inmates. id. at 1169. The same defendants were also charged
with knowingly providing drugs which were used in spotted fever and typhus experiments
in concentration camps. The Tribunal dismissed the charge and found that Farben had
discontinued dispatching drugs as soon as the firm suspected that such activity was being
conducted in the camps. Id. at 1171-72. A central question in determining whether the
defendants were on notice of the experiments centered on whether the German word
"Versuch" in the medical reports connoted "experiment" or the more limited notion of a
"test." Id. at 1172.
344. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying texts.
346. See supra notes 276-78 and accompanying texts.
347. See supra notes 279-82 and accompanying texts.
348. See supra notes 238-39, 264 and accompanying texts.
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reflected a reluctance to impute knowledge to military and governmental
officials. 49 Officials possessed a duty to intervene to the extent of theirS 350
authority and power to prevent and to punish war crimes. In some
instances, a duty was placed on individuals who exercised informal
influence rather than authoritative power.31 The obligation on a com-
mander to take energetic and efficient affirmative action to prevent
criminal conductI1 was not qualified by the possibility that this might result2353
in criminal prosecution for insubordination.
World War II war crimes trials, as illustrated, heavily relied upon the
doctrine of command responsibility to prosecute high-level military and
civilian officials. The decisions were marked by a continuing conflict
between the broad test articulated in Yamashita and the stricter knowledge
or gross negligence standard set in the Tokyo and High Command cases.
The expansive interpretation was most pronounced in a series of
prosecutions before military tribunals of individuals alleged to have
victimized nationals of the presiding court.3 54
IV. THE VIETNAM WAR
The issue of command responsibility was central in the controversy
over the Vietnam War.355 Presidential advisor Townsend Hoopes
expressed outrage over the allegation that the actions of American civilian
and military leaders were analogous to those of the defendants at
349. See supr notes 334-42 and accompanying texts.
350. See supra notes 296, 300 and accompanying texts.
351. See supra notes 329-300 and accompanying texts.
352. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
353. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
354. See Trial Of S.S. Brigadefuhrer Kurt Meyer, 1948 L. REP. WAR CRIM. 97 (Dec. 10-28,
1945); Trial of Kurt Student, 1948 L. REP. WAR CRIM. 118 (May 10, 1946); Trial of Takashi
Sakai, 1949 L. REP. WAR CRIM. 1 (Aug. 19, 1946); Trial of Lieutenant General Baba
Masao, 1949 L. REP- WAR CRINA. 56 (June 2,1947).
355. See generally TELFORD TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM: AN AMERICAN
TRAGEDY (1970). Some limited recognition of the principle of command responsibility was
provided in the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of 1968. Article Two extended the Convention to
representatives of the State authority who "tolerate" the commission of war crimes and
crimes against humanity. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Criminals and Crimes Against Humanity, G.A. Res. 2391, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
18), at 40, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).
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356Nuremberg. Nuremberg prosecutor Telford Taylor opined that it was an
open question whether American civilian officials possessed the requisite
depth and degree of knowledge to be held criminally culpable. Taylor,
however, contended that a stronger case could be made for the criminal
liability of the military command structure which possessed an unprece-
dented degree of mobility, resources and information with which to
monitor and to control combat forces.358 Taylor concluded that the moral
health of America would not be redeemed until its leaders were "willing to
scrutinize their behavior by the same standards that their revered
predecessors applied to Tomayuki Yamashita 25 years ago. 359 This
analysis was challenged by Waldemar A. Solf, of the Judge Advocate
General Department of the United States Army, who contended that
adequate procedural precautions to prevent and to punish war crimes had
been established and that there was no evidence that high-echelon military
officials had countenanced criminal conduct. 60 Solf disputed that
Yamashita established a strict liability standard and argued that there was
no evidence that American decision-makers either were aware of war
crimes or had wantonly and immorally failed to curb such conduct.1
61
In 1971, First Lieutenant William Calley was convicted of the pre-
meditated murder of Vietnamese civilians.362 The United States Court of
Military Appeals, in reviewing the evidence, determined that Lieutenant
Calley had directed and had personally participated in the intentional
killing of unarmed men, women, and children who were in the custody of
363
combatants under Calley's command. In addition, the Court confirmed
that Calley had intentionally killed a Vietnamese monk and had shot a
child.36
Several months later, Captain Ernest Medina, Calley's company
commander who had been positioned outside My Lai, was acquitted of the
356. Townsend Hoopes, The Nuremberg Suggestion, in CRIMES OF WAR: A LEGAL,
POLrIICAL-DOCUMENTARY, AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
LEADERS, CITIZENS, AND SOLDIERS FOR CRIMINAL ACTS IN WAR 233 (Richard A. Falk et
al. eds. 1971).
357. TAYLOR, supra note 355, at 180.
358. Id. at 180-81.
359. Id. at 182.
360. Waldemar A. SoIlf, A Response to Telford Taylor's Nuremberg and Vietnam: An
American Tragedy, 5 AKRON L. REV. 43, 58-59 (1972).
361, Id. at 59-60.
362. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, affirmed 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973).
363. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 24.
364. Id.
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involuntary manslaughter of a hundred human beings. 6 ' The prosecution
alleged that Medina had been informed through sight, sound and radio
transmission that his subordinates were killing noncombatants. 366 He was
accused of having failed to exercise command responsibility and of having
neglected to fulfill his duty to take necessary and reasonable steps to halt
367this activity. A review of the evidence indicates that Medina must have
been aware that the troops had detained and were killing civilians.169 As
a ten year accomplished military veteran,37 ° Medina must have found it
curious that there was a lack of radio traffic from troops seeking tactical
guidance at the same time that there was continuous automatic weapons
fire from American troops. 17 ' He himself encountered the bodies of dead
112
civilians at the outskirts of the village. Two hours into the operation it
was clear that there were no Viet Cong in the area and Medina ordered
the Americans to cease fire.
3 73
American military judge Kenneth Howard abandoned the Yamashita
standard and instructed the jury that Medina should be found criminally
liable in the event that he possessed actual knowledge that troops or others
subject to his control were committing or were about to commit war crimes
and that he wrongfully failed to take necessary and reasonable steps to
insure compliance with the law of war.3 74 The Court thus required that
Medina possess "actual knowledge plus a wrongful failure to act....
[M]ere presence at the scene without knowledge will not suffice. [T]he
commander-subordinate relationship alone will not allow an inference of
knowledge. '3 75 Howard stressed that while a commander was not required
to "actually see an atrocity being committed" that "it is essential that he
know that his subordinates are in the process of committing atrocities or
about to commit atrocities. '" 3 6
365. Kenneth A. Howard, Command Responsibility for War Crimes, 21 J. PUB. L. 7, 8
(1972).
366. Id. at 9.
367. Id.
368. MICHAEL BILTON & KEVIN SIM, FOUR HoURNS IN My LAI 119 (1992).
369. Id. at 125-26, 128.
370. Id. at 52.
371. Id. at 128.
372. Id. at 126-27. Medina had viewed at least one hundred civilian corpses. Id. at 134. He,
himself, had shot a woman in a rice paddy. Id. at 172-73.
373. Id. at 141, 145.
374. Howard, supra note 365, at 10-11.
375. Id. at 11.
376. Id. at 11-12.
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Telford Taylor criticized the instructions, arguing that the knowledge
standard was too strict.377 Professor Roger Clark echoed these sentiments
and contrasted the strict liability standard imposed upon General
Yamashita with the narrowly crafted actual knowledge test applied in
Medina: it is "hard to avoid the feeling that there is a certain amount of
hypocrisy lurking somewhere."37' Clark pointed out that the law of
homicide encompassed a range of mental states and that the jury should
have been instructed that "the incompetent commander who does not
know, but ought to know, what his men are about is being culpably
negligent and may be convicted of... manslaughter."' 379 He noted that the
law of war aspired to minimize the loss of human life and thereby to affirm
the importance of humanitarianism. These values, in Clark's view were
best protected under a broad view of command responsibility.3 s' Clark
concluded that the "actual knowledge test, in a context like My Lai, is an
invitation to the commander to see and hear no evil. It is not consistent
with a serious effort to make the command structure responsive to the
humanitarian goals involved.
392
Medina thus limited command responsibility to instances in which a
military official possessed actual knowledge of the commission of war
crimes and failed to exercise control over subordinates subject to his
command."" The Court's failure to follow the broad test articulated in
Yamashita or a variant of the negligence standard suggests that the
instructions were intended to insure that Medina was exonerated. 38 The
instructions were particularly curious since the Army Field Manual on the
Law of Land Warfare provided for liability in those instances in which a
commander possessed "actual knowledge," or "should have knowledge
through reports received by him" or through "other means.
'385
377. Id. at 8.
378. Roger S. Clark, Medina: An Essay on the Principles of Criminal Liability for
Homicide, 5 RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 59, 72 (1975).
379. Id. at 74.
380. Id. at 78.
381. Id.
382. Id. Clark advocated reliance on a negligence standard based on the departure from
the standard expected from a reasonable person rather than the more demanding wanton
and reckless test. See id. at 77.
383. Howard, supra note 365, at 12.
384. See Clark, supra note 378, at 72 n.50, quoting Telford Taylor.
385. See U.S. Dep't of Army, Field Manual 27-10, Law of Land Warfare, 510, at 178-79
(1956) quoted in Howard, supra note 365, at 15 n.15.
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Equally as suggestive of a protective attitude was the failure to prose-
cute the high-ranking officers responsible for planning, supervising and
subsequently concealing the My Lai massacre.386 Only one officer accused
of involvement in sequestering or destroying evidence was ultimately
brought before a court-martial, and he was acquitted.387 Charges against
other officers of a dereliction of duty and of a failure to obey lawful
regulations were dismissed.""
Samuel W. Koster, Commander of the 23rd Infantry (Americal) Divi-
sion, was the commanding officer of the specially organized unit which
launched the My Lai operation. 8 9 He compiled an illustrious military
career which spanned World War II, Korea and Vietnam and, following
service in Southeast Asia, Koster was appointed Superintendent at West
Point.'9
The Pentagon Peers Report on the My Lai incident concluded that
Koster poorly prepared plans for handling prisoners, failed to respond to
information that civilians had been killed, and may have initiated a
391
conspiracy to conceal information concerning the My Lai massacre.
Lieutenant General Jonathan Seaman nevertheless dismissed the charges
against Koster of failing to report civilian deaths and of neglecting to
conduct a proper investigation while noting that Koster's performance
"'did not meet the high standards expected of a division commander.,'
39 2
Critics complained that this decision was a disservice to the rule of
international law, the law of war and the United States Constitution.9 3
Secretary of the Army Stanley Resor responded by imposing adminis-
trative sanctions on Koster."4 These included vacating Koster's appoint-
ment as a temporary major-general, inserting a letter of censure into his
personnel file, and withdrawing Koster's Distinguished Service Medal.
39 5
Resor stressed that Koster was not responsible for the "murders them-
selves" and that the sanctions were based on Koster's inadequate
386. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, REVIEW OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO
THE My LAI INCIDENT: THE REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION (1970) [hereinafter Peers
Report].
387. BILTON, supra note 368, at 325.
388. Id. at 325-26.
389. See Koster v. United States, 685 F.2d 407, 408 (U.S. Ct. C1. 1982).
390. Id. at 409.
391. Peers Report, supra note 386, at 12-9-12-12.
392. BILTON, supra note 368, at 326.
393. Id. at 326-27.
394. Koster, 685 F.2d at 409.
395. Id. at 409-10.
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investigation into the My Lai incident.39' The Secretary elaborated that
military commanders were not responsible for all the acts of their
subordinates; they, for instance, clearly could not be held liable for isolated
and occasional omissions. 397 However, Resor admonished that officers
must be held accountable for matters of serious import over which they
asserted personal charge and control.9 8 A contrary "conclusion would
render essentially meaningless and unenforceable the concepts of great
command responsibility accompanying senior positions of authority." 399
Reasor recognized that Koster may not have intentionally presided
over an inadequate investigation, but that as a result of inattentiveness or
indifference that he did "permit this to happen" despite the significant
resources at his disposal.400 The Secretary emphasized that the expectations
for commanders conducting investigations, particularly during armed
conflict, have always been strict and stringent: "Too much is at stake for it
to be otherwise. General Koster must be measured by that test. 40'
The United States Court of Claims affirmed the decision of the Army
Board for Correction of Military Records upholding the administrative
sanctions imposed on Koster. 4°2 The Court cited four irregularities that
should have alerted Koster to the need for a fair and full investigation.4 °3
First, following the My Lai incident Koster was informed that 128 enemy
and only two American soldiers had been killed; and a report recorded the
death of twenty civilians from United States artillery fire, an unusually
404large number of casualties. In addition, Koster received a report from an
American helicopter pilot who had witnessed and attempted to halt the
killings at My Lai.r - A month later, a Viet Cong propaganda leaflet
charged that United States troops had massacred some 500 civilians in and
around My Lai.40
Koster initiated an investigation which failed to uncover the intrica-
cies of the incident and, as a result, an accurate account of the events at the
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My Lai did not emerge for over a year 0 7 The Court noted that the failure
of this inquiry was due to a variety of circumstances, including what may
have been a cover-up by subordinates within Koster's chain of command.4
The Court of Claims approvingly quoted Secretary Resor's conclusion that
there was no area in which a strict standard of command liability was as
necessary as the investigation of misconduct and that the sanctions
imposed on Koster were accordingly neither arbitrary or capricious. 4°9
My Lai was not the only incident which resulted in charges of com-
mand culpability. In Goldman, The United States Court of Military
Review convicted a company commander of dereliction of duty for failing
to report the murder of an enemy female who was in the custody of
American troops.41 0 A member of Goldman's unit had compelled a male
detainee to shoot the nurse and then had fired two shots into her head.4
The defendant was situated sixty feet from the shooting and later
reportedly was informed that a Vietnamese had grabbed a rifle and had
shot one of the nurses." ' The defendant undoubtedly heard the shots, saw
blood on the perpetrator and remarked that they would all be punished in
the event that the remaining female detainee reported what had tran-
spired.4 1 ' The Court determined that the defendant possessed full
knowledge of this serious incident and had failed to meet his obligation to
-- - 414
report the event to authorities. In sentencing, the defendant to a
reprimand and forfeiture of one hundred dollars per month for twelve
months, the judges stressed that the defendant was the product of a
military family, had proved an outstanding officer, and had been the
recipient of numerous service awards. 5
This lackadaisical leadership was all too typical. An analysis con-
ducted by Guenter Lewy concluded that most of the prosecutions for
willful killings of noncombatants, the abuse of prisoners or for the
mutilation of corpses, resulted from complaints by individuals discharged
416
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charged with war crimes also received more lenient treatment than
enlisted men: sixty-one percent of officers either had their charges
dismissed, were acquitted or received an administrative sanction rather
than being subjected to trial; the corresponding figure for enlisted men was
thirty-four percent .4 " Lewy speculated that the actual knowledge test
established in Medina may have effectively insulated military officials
418
from trial and accounted for the limited prosecution of commanders.
In 1994, American army Captain Lawrence Rockwood unsuccessfully
attempted to rely on command responsibility to justify his effort to halt
alleged violations of international human rights. 4 '9 The United States, in
1994, invaded Haiti in Operation Uphold Democracy to restore order on
the Caribbean island. Captain Lawrence P. Rockwood, a counterintelli-
gence officer for Joint Task Force (JTF) 190, believing that Haitian
prisoners were being abused, tortured and killed, left his assignment and. ...  .421
entered and inspected the National Penitentiary in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.
A United States court-martial determined that Rockwood had acted on
the basis of speculation and had unjustifiably left his place of duty and
disobeyed orders. 4" He was convicted of absence without leave, willfulr. 421
disobedience to an officer and of conduct unbecoming an officer.
The Court Martial ruled that any abuses which might have occurred
had been committed by Haitian soldiers who were not under American
operational or territorial command. At any rate, there was no indication
that the JTF 190 Commander had ordered or even possessed actual or
421
constructive knowledge of the alleged abuses, or that such abuses, in
fact, had occurred.426 In addition, The Court Martial pointed out that
Rockwood was a staff officer who was not charged with an international
obligation to act under the doctrine of command responsibility. - He was
convicted despite the fact that a United States Department of State report
417. Id. at 352.
418. id. at 360. For a discussion of command responsibility in Vietnam, see William V.
O'Brien, The Law of War, Command Responsibility and Vietnam, 60 GEO. L.J. 605 (1972).
419. Major Edward J. O'Brien, The Nuremberg Principles, Command Responsibility, and
the Defense of Captain Rockwood, 149 MIL. L. REV. 275-76 n.4 (1995).
420. id.
421. Id. at 275.
422. Id. at 275-76.
423. Id. at 276 n.5.
424. Id. at 278, 288.
425. O'Brien, supra note 419, at 278-79 n.10, 299.
426. Id. at 278-79, 288-89.
427. Id. at 290-91.
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in his possession detailed the unhealthy conditions, inadequate diet and
428poor health care in Haitian prisons.
In sum, American court martials appear to have been influenced by
political considerations in their reluctance to impose command
culpability. 431' The instructions in Medina adopted an actual knowledge
standard. which deviated from both the Yamashita test established by the
United States Supreme Court and the stricter actual or constructive
4311knowledge or gross negligence test articulated at Tokyo. In Goldman,
the Court Martial determined that Goldman was an exemplary officer and
sentenced him to an insignificant sentence in light of the gravity of his
crimes. 3' The Rockwood court circumvented the issue of command
responsibility by determining that Rockwood had not occupied an
authoritative position and that the Haitian forces were not within the
American chain of command.433
V. THE SABRA AND SHATILLA INCIDENTS
In reaction to the assassination of Lebanese President-elect and Chris-
tian Phalangist leader Bashir Jemayel, in September 1982, Israeli defense
forces (I.D.F.) entered West Beirut in order to prevent an escalating cycle
of violence between Christian and Muslim militias. 34 The Israelis then
directed their Phalangist allies to enter the Sabra and Shatilla refugee
camp,43 5 which was considered a center of Palestinian guerilla activity.
4 13
This task was deemed too dangerous for the I.D.F and was intended to
signal to Israeli public opinion that the Phalangists were contributing to
the armed struggle against Palestinian partisans.437 The Phalangist
experience in Lebanon also was thought to have provided the Christian
428. Id. at 275-76 n.4, 290 n.72.
429. See supra notes 416-18 and accompanying texts.
430. See supra notes 384-88 and accompanying texts.
431. See supra notes 374-85 and accompanying texts.
432. See supra notes 414-15 and accompanying texts.
433. See supra notes 424-28 and accompanying texts.
434. Israel: Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into the Events at the Refugee
Camps in Beruit, Final Report, 22 I.L.M. 473,478 (1983) [hereinafter Kahan Commission].
See Weston D. Burnett, Command Responsibility and a Case Study of the Criminal
Responsibility of Israeli Military Commanders for the Pogrom at Shatila and Sabra, 107 MtL.
L. REV. 71 (1985).
435. Kahan Commission, supra note 434, at 498.
436. See id. at 481.
437. See id. at 498.
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militia with a unique capacity to detect and to detain Palestinian
guerillas.438 Once inside the camp, the Phalangist passion erupted, resulting
in the slaughter of between seven and eight hundred civilians.39
There was no suggestion of a conspiracy between the I.D.F. and Pha-
langists or that Israeli troops had participated in the killings or that the
slaughter had been visible or audible from the Israeli observation post.40
The evidence, in fact, indicated that Israeli military officials had been well
-aware of the Phalangist's disregard for legalities and desire for revenge
and had cautioned their Lebanese allies to respect the civilian inhabi-
tants.4 '
The Israeli Cabinet appointed a commission of inquiry, headed by
Yitzhak Kahan, President of the Supreme Court, which found that the
Phalangists were directly responsible for the atrocities.04 Kahan, however,
further determined that those officials who had approved, knew or
implemented the Phalangist entry into the camps should have anticipated
443the likelihood of slaughter. Yet, these individuals failed to deter or to
diminish the danger.4" The report concluded that civilian and military
officials possessed "indirect responsibility" regardless whether they
harbored a criminal intent or merely avoided addressing the anticipated
atrocities."6 Indirect responsibility also was extended to individuals who,
after receiving an account of the killings, failed to do "everything within
their power to stop them." '
The Kahan Report conceded that the formal legal responsibility of
Israeli officials for the occupants of Sabra and Shatilla was problematic in
light of the uncertainty as to whether the Jewish State could be considered
an occupying power under customary international law. 47 The report,
however, adopted the unprecedented position that even if these transna-
tional norms were inapplicable that a duty arose from the "obligations
applying to every civilized nation and the ethical rules accepted by civilized
438. Id.
439. Id. at 491.
440. Id. at 495.
441. Kahan Commission, supra note 434, at 481.
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people.""48 This reflected the view that the cultivation of universal moral
norms required that responsibility should be placed on the perpetrators as
well as those "who could and should have prevented" the commission of
the Phalangist's criminal conduct. 449 Kahan recognized that there were
persuasive rationales for directing the Phalangists to enter Sabra and
Shatilla.5 0 The report nevertheless admonished that this decision should
have been accompanied by precautions and protections against the type of
terror which officials "were obligated to foresee as probable., 451 In
addition, Israeli military officials were found to have failed to take
"energetic and immediate actions" to restrain the Phalangists in response
to the first reports of repression.5 2
A "certain degree of responsibility" was imposed on Prime Minister
Menachem Begin who had been informed at a cabinet meeting of the
Phalangist incursion into the camp thirty-six hours following the deci-
sion.453 There was no indication that he was subsequently told that civilians
had been killed.454 Begin did not react to the warning expressed by Deputy
Prime Minister David Levy at the cabinet meeting that the Phalangists
could be expected to exact retribution. 5 The commission concluded that
Begin had demonstrated little interest or alarm over the next two days and
had not questioned the failure of his subordinates to keep him informed.
His indifference was considered indefensible in light of the fact that it was
"foreseeable and possible" that the Phalangists would "commit acts of
revenge. ,41' The Kahan Report concluded that an expression of concern by
Begin might have alerted the Defense Minister and Chief of Staff to adopt
protective measures.4 5 8 This "lack of involvement" merited the imposition
of a "certain degree of responsibility.
4 5 9
448. Id. The Kahan Report supported this broad imposition of responsibility by citing
biblical injunctions as well the plight of Jews victimized by pogroms. Id.
449. [d. at 496-97.
450. Id. at 498.
451. Id. at 499.
452. Id. at 497-98.
453. Kahan Commission, supra note 434, at 501.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 484.
456. Id. at 501.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Kahan Commission, supra note 434, at 501.
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Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir conceded that a fellow cabinet
member had complained to him of Phalangist "'unruliness.' "460 The official,
on the other hand, insisted that he had alerted Shamir of the "'slaughter'
which was being perpetrated by the Phalangists. 46' The Foreign Minister
conceded that he had discounted the report based on his fellow minister's
well-known opposition to the incursion into Lebanon.462 The commission
concluded that Shamir, in light of Minister Levy's admonition, should have
responded to the cabinet member's warning with "sensitivity and
alertness" and, at a minimum, should have contacted Defense Minister
461Sharon. Shamir was determined to have "erred in not taking any
measures after the conversation.., about the Phalangist actions in the
camps.
, 464
Kahan thus adopted a broad view of command responsibility, holding
Menachim Begin partially responsible for his indifferent and disinterested
posture after being informed that revenge killings in the camps were
"foreseeable and possible."'465 Foreign Minister Yitzak Shamir also was
adjudged to have "erred" in failing to have responded with sufficient
concern to the statement of a fellow minister concerning the killings which
were being perpetrated in Sabra and Shatilla.4  In both cases, the
Commission appears to have required officials to conduct inquiries and to
467
monitor events after being notified of potential criminal conduct. This
liberal "notice" standard may have reflected the special obligation of high-
ranking civilian decision-makers such as Begin and Shamir. Absent a
reliable report regarding the killings, Begin and Shamir arguably cannot be
469
characterized as having acted in a wanton or grossly negligent standard.
The Kahan Report recommended the dismissal of Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon.470 Sharon, along with Chief of Staff Rafael Etan, authorized
the Phalangist entry into the camps.4 1 He was well-acquainted with the
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practices and procedures of the Christian militia and the commission noted
that he need not have possessed prophetic powers in order to have
anticipated the danger of depredations. 2 Yet, Kahan observed that
Sharon focused exclusively on the advantages while disregarding the
potential perils of the Phalangist incursion. 3 The report stressed that
Sharon, as a politician responsible for Israel's security affairs and as a
significant strategist in the war in Lebanon, possessed the duty to consider
the costs and consequences of intervention, including the possible
humanitarian and political price.474 Once having instructed the Phalangists
to intervene, Sharon was further obligated to provide supervision and
safeguards against slaughter; the routine warnings which were issued to the
Phalangists clearly were inadequate.47 ' Absent effective controls, the
Kahan Report concluded that Sharon was obligated to cancel the
campaign. 6
The Kahan Report also criticized the disinterest displayed by Lieu-
tenant General Rafael Eitan, Chief of Staff in the Defense Ministry.
47
Eitan was found to have disregarded his duty when, together with the
Minister of Defense, he approved the Phalangist's entry into the camps
without insuring the safety of the residents or providing for an adequate
flow of information.478 Upon receiving reports that the Phalangists had
'"gone too far,' ' ,479 Eitan flew to Beirut and immediately met with the
Phalangist commanders.4 m He later explained that he had concluded that
the allegations of atrocity were erroneous since the Phalangists failed to
mention the killings.48 ' As a result, instead of confirming the order
canceling the operation issued by a lower-ranking Israeli officer, Eitan
permitted additional Phalangists to enter the camp and equipped them
with tractors to bulldoze terrorist concentrations . The Kahan Report
concluded that Eitan was obligated to inquire into whether atrocities were
occurring and, in the event that he was not "satisfied that excesses had not
472. Id. at 502.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 503.
476. Kahan Commission, supra note 434, at 503.
477. Id. at 505.
478. Id. at 505-06.
479. Id. at 485-86.
480. Id. at 488.
481. Id. at 506-07.
482. Kahan Commission, supra note 434, at 507.
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been committed," he was required to take measures to prevent the
4831
continuation of the abuses. Instead, the Phalangist's may have reasona-
bly concluded from Eitan's silence and support that the I.D.F. condoned or
encouraged the killings.8
Major General Yehoshua Saguy, Director of Israeli Military Intelli-
gence, issued assessments of the risks of I.D.F. intervention into West
Beirut which were deemed to have failed to adequately warn civilian and
military officials of the distinct danger that the Phalangists would seek
retribution!" He was present during discussions concerning the role of the
Phalangists, but claimed to have been unaware of the precise parameters• .- 486
of their role and responsibility. Even after receiving reports of the
Phalangist entry into the camp and the possible killing of three hundred,
Saguy failed to investigate or to contact the Chief-of-Staff or the Defense
Minister 8' He explained that he was a well-known opponent of coopera-
tion with the Phalangists and that his warnings likely would have been
dismissed 88 The Kahan Report, however, admonished that this had not
relieved him of the obligation to issue an explicit and express assessment
of the risks of retribution and to clarify and to calculate the costs and489
consequences. Saguy's "inaction" constituted a breach of the duty
incumbent on the director of Military Intelligence.9
Major General Amir Drori, Head of the Northern Command, antici-
pated that the Phalangists might act in an uncontrolled fashion in the
refugee camp.491 This was reinforced by verbal reports from Israeli officers
indicating that civilians likely were at risk.492 Drori promptly ordered a
cessation of Phalangist operations, telephoned the Chief-of-Staff that the
Phalangists "'had overdone it,"' and attempted to persuaded the Lebanese
Army to restore order in the camp.493 The Kahan commission concluded
that there was no evidence that Drori had been informed of the killings
483. Id.
484. Id. at 505-07.
485. Id. at 509.
486. Id. at 508-09.
487. Id. at 486.
488. Kahan Commission, supra note 434, at 509.
489. Id.
490. Id. The Kahan Report recommended his dismissal. Id. at 519. For an assessment of the
responsibility of the unidentified Head of the Mossad, see id. at 509-10.
491. Id. at 511.
492. Id. at 485.
493. Id. at 511.
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and that he had acted "properly, wisely, and responsibly, with sufficient
alertness., 494 Drori, however, was criticized for neglecting to fully pursue
the reported abuses with Phalangist leaders and with superior officers and
for failing to urge Lieutenant General Eitan to discuss the issue with the
Phalangists in Beirut.49 ' The commission concluded that Drori's "disen-
gagement" constituted a breach of duty.
496
Brigadier General Amos Yaron was present at the forward command
post and received three reports of killings, including intelligence from a
Phalangist liaison officer recording the death of three hundred.497 Yaron
promptly admonished the Phalanguist liaison officer and a unit com-
mander, but failed to convey this information to the Chief of Staff and
Head of the Northern Command.498 Yaron later explained that he had
been more concerned with insuring that the I.D.F. was not involved in
operations in the camps than with preventing a massacre. 49 9 This consti-
tuted a "mistaken judgment" and "grave error" and comprised a breach of
his duty.'°°
In summary, in 1982, the Israeli cabinet formed the Kahan Commis-
sion to inquire into the killings in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps.501
The commission was not limited by prevailing international legal doctrine
and relied on universal moral and ethical norms to extend command
responsibility to Israeli civilian and military officials. 2 Kahan did not
question the decision to cleanse the camps of Palestinian guerillas. 03
Instead, the commission held officials accountable for failing to consider
and to calculate the costs and consequences of this decision and for
neglecting to provide the necessary precautions and protections.5
s4
The Kahan Report contributed to the jurisprudence of command
responsibility by supplementing the intentional or gross disregard test with
a mere "notice" standard for high-ranking civilian and military decision-
494. Kahan Commission, supra note 434, at 511.
495. Id. at 51112.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 512.
498. Id. See also id. at 482-83.
499. Id. at 513.
500. Kahan Commission, supra note 434, at 513-14.
501. Id. at 434-42.
502. See supra notes 447-52 and accompanying texts.
503. See supra note 450 and accompanying text.
504. See supra notes 473-74 and accompanying texts.
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makers."" These officials, along with those apprised of possible criminal
conduct, were required to affirmatively inquire into alleged misconduct."1
6
Commanders also possessed the obligation to convey relevant facts to
higher level decision-makers. Following the decision to send the
Phalangists into the camp, officials were charged with the customary
obligation to monitor the operation and to safeguard civilians.5°s Reports
of misconduct were to be met with vigorous action, such as canceling the
operation and taking steps to restore order. 0 9 The notion that Israeli
decision-makers were responsible for the actions of the Phalangists was an
important application of the concept of command responsibility to
encompass troops outside of the chain of command over whom decision-
makers exercised effective informal control."1
VI. THE 1977 PROTOCOL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION
Three issues concerning command responsibility required clarifica-
tion: the intent or knowledge requirement, the scope of command
responsibility and the standard for remedial action. A review of the
historical record reveals four closely-related approaches to the intent
standard. The stringency of the Yamashita strict liability test 51 was
softened by the actual and constructive knowledge and gross negligence
standard adopted by the tribunals in the Tokyo512 and High Command
decisions. 51 '3 The Kahan Report adopted a mere negligence test for high-
level civilian officials which required officials to investigate facts which
suggested that war crimes might be committed.5!1 4 This constituted a
significant expansion of the actual knowledge test articulated in Medina."'S
The central controversies revolved around the evidentiary standard
required to presume or to circumstantially establish constructive
knowledge and whether an official was obligated to investigate facts from
which a reasonable person might conclude that war crimes may have
505. See supra notes 455-58, 463-64 and accompanying texts.
506. See supra notes 483-84 and accompanying texts.
507. See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying texts.
508. See supra note 475 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 493-496 and accompanying texts.
510. See supra notes 471, 478 and accompanying texts.
511. See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying texts.
512. See supra notes 172-77 and accompanying texts.
513. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
514. See supra notes 453-59 and accompanying texts.
515. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying texts.
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occurred or whether a duty only arose in clear and compelling cases. 6 The
issue also remained whether the scope of a commander's responsibility
should be limited to the chain of command or also should include
territorial authority as well as units over whom an official exercised
influence or informal control.5 7 The extent of required remedial action and
whether officials were required to take steps which transcended their
formal authority also required clarification."'
The requirements of international law pertaining to command respon-
sibility were clarified in the 1977 Protocol to the Geneva Convention519
which codified the requirements of customary international law.120 Article
86(2) provides that the fact that a breach of the Convention was commit-
ted by a subordinate does not relieve his superiors from responsibility in
those instances in which the superiors "knew, or had information which
should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time"
that the subordinate was "committing or was going to commit such a
breach. 5 21 Superiors under these circumstances were required to "take all
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.
' '12
This may entail either criminal or disciplinary punishment, which ever is
appropriate under the circumstances. 23
The central commentary on the Protocol notes that Article 86(2) is
sufficiently elastic to incorporate both a specific intent and a gross
negligence standard. A good faith, but deficient judgment, or inadver-
516. See supra notes 453-59 and accompanying texts.
517. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying texts.
518. See supra notes 210-17 and accompanying texts.
519. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, art.
86(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
520. See George H. Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Laws of War: A Reply to
Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva Protocol 1, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 719 (1986).
521. Protocol I, supra note 519, art. 86(2).
522. Id.
523. Id. Article 86(1) imposes a duty on the High Contracting Parties and the Parties to a
conflict to "repress grave breaches" and to "take measures necessary to suppress all other
breaches" of the Convention which "result from a failure to act when under a duty to do
so." This unprecedented provision provides for State responsibility for war crimes which
result from a failure by relevant officials to repress war crimes. Id. art. 86(1). Grave
breaches are accorded the status of war crimes. See id. art. 85(5).
524. See COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 1012 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds. 1987) [hereinafter
Commentary].
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tence, generally are not subject to sanction; the negligence must be
sufficiently serious to support a charge of malicious intent.
The concept of a superior connotes officials who exercise direct au-
thority over the subordinates who perpetrated the criminal acts as well as
526officials who possess control over combatants. The latter encompasses
territorial commanders who exercise indirect control over troops within
the ambit of their authority."' This broad view of command authority is
clarified in Article 87(1) which specifies that military officials are to
suppress and to report breaches of the Convention committed by "armed
forces under their command" and "other persons under their control.
528
The liability of commanders extends from the commander-in-chief down529
to the lowest level officials in the chain of command.
The "should have enabled them to conclude" standard was included
to counter the difficulty of establishing actual knowledge."3 The commen-
tary noted that the case law established that a superior may not claim to be
unaware of reports addressed to him."' In addition, he is deemed to be
aware of widespread, numerous, notorious and chronologically continuous
112breaches. A superior also was charged with awareness of contextual
considerations such as the level of training in the law of war and the
treatment of prisoners, the means and mode of attack, the density of the
targeted population and the availability of medical services.533 The
commentary noted that in several "flagrant cases" stemming from World
War II that tribunals drew on the above factors in imputing knowledge to
officials who attempted to evade responsibility by claiming ignorance of
criminal conduct.
525. Id. Article 86(2) extends to both grave and ordinary breaches of the Protocol. Grave
breaches are accorded the status of war crimes. See Protocol I, supra note 519, art. 85(5).
They are subject to a "prosecute or extradite" requirement. See Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Oct. 21, 1950, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287.
526. Commentary, supra note 524, at 1013.
527. Id. at 1020, 1023.
528. Protocol I, supra note 519, art. 87(1).
529. Commentary, supra note 524, at 1019.
530. Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 93 AM. J. INT'L L.
573, 589 (1999).
531. Commentary, supra note 524, at 1014.
532. Id. at 1016.
533. Id. at 1014.
534. Id.
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Article 86(2) requires a commander to take measures to both prevent
and to punish breaches of the Geneva Convention."' This is reinforced by
Article 87(3) which requires a military official who is aware that subordi-
nates or other persons under his control are going to commit or have
committed a breach of the Convention to initiate steps to prevent
violations and, where appropriate, to "initiate disciplinary or penal
action. ' Article 86(2) restricts a commander's obligation to measures
which are "feasible" and "within their [the commander's] powers.,1
37
Military officials thus are not required to undertake acts which are outside
the scope of their authority or to exhaust every possible and imaginable
avenue of redress. 53' The commentary nevertheless stresses that military
officials at every level are obligated to act to prevent violations of the
Convention. 3 ' This requires a range of ambitious and aggressive acts to
control and curb war crimes."'
The is reinforced by Article 87(1) which establishes a general duty on
military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under
their command and other persons under their control, to prevent and to
suppress and to report breaches of the Convention.54' As part of this
general obligation, Article 87(2) provides that commanders are to ensure
535. Id at 1015.
536. Protocol I, supra 519, art. 87(1).
537. Commentary, supra note 524, at 1015.
538. See id. The commentary notes that Article 87 requires a commander who is in
command of a sector to do everything within his power to address breaches against
individuals for whom he is Tesponsible, even when committed by units that are not within
his chain of command. The commentary also makes the unprecedented assertion that this
duty attaches to a commander who lacks authority over the territory. Id. at 1020.
539. Id. at 1022. The commentary cites the duty of non-commissioned officers to intervene
to prevent a combatant from a wounded adversary or civilian. A lieutenant must mark a
protected place, such as a hospital, that he encounters during an advance. A company
commander is obligated to shelter prisoners from attack. A battalion commander must halt
an attack that he discovers is being directed at a locale which he determines no longer
possesses military significance. A regimental commander is required to select sites to avoid
indiscriminate attacks. Id. The commentary cites the duty of non-commissioned officers to
intervene to prevent a combatant from killing a wounded adversary or civilian. A
lieutenant must mark a protected place, such as a hospital, which he encounters during an
advance. A company commander is obligated to shelter prisoners from attack. A battalion
commander must halt an attack which he discovers is being directed at a locale which he
determines no longer possesses military significance. A regimental commander is required
to select sites to avoid indiscriminate attacks. Id.
540. See id.
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that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their
obligations under the Geneva Convention.14' These provisions recognize
that military officers are positioned to encourage support for the law of
war, impose discipline, limit the deployment of unnecessary force and to
insure a flow of accurate information and reports.
543
In summary, the Geneva Protocol constituted a compromise. Military
officials are held responsible for transgressions in those instances in which
they possessed actual or constructive knowledge or disregarded informa-1 44
tion indicating that war crimes had been or were about to be committed.
The "should have enabled them to conclude" standard while less harsh
than strict liability also insures that officials cannot adopt a disengaged and
disinterested demeanor. 45At the same time that officials may not adopt a
passive posture, there is no requirement that they actively and affirma-
546
tively monitor and investigate events and circumstances. Their liability
extends to the acts of subordinates as well as to troops under their
control. 47 Officials are obligated to undertake "feasible measures" which
are "within their power;" they are not required to undertake all possible or
extraordinary efforts . 4
The Protocol provision was incorporated, with slight modification,
into the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind. 4" The article on command responsibility provides for command
responsibility in those instances in which superiors "knew or had
information enabling them to conclude" that a subordinate was commit-
ting or was going to commit a crime. 50 A superior had a duty to undertake
"all feasible measures within their power" to prevent or repress the
crime.551
542. Id. art. 87(2).
543. Commentary, supra note 524, at 1022.
544. See supra note 521 and accompanying text.
545. See supra notes 530-36 and accompanying texts.
546. See supra notes 533-34 and accompanying texts.
547. See supra notes 526-29 and accompanying texts.
548. See supra notes 536-40 and accompanying texts.
549. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
at 242, art. 12, U.N. Doc. A146/10 (1991).
550. Id.
551. Id. The International Law Commission stressed there was no intention for the
interpretation of this provision to vary from the terms of the Additional Protocol I (II),
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 71-72 (discussing article 10) (1988).
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Several decisions of the International Criminal Tribunals for Yugosla-
via and Rwanda contain comprehensive commentaries on the contempo-
rary standard for command responsibility.
VII. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL FOR YUGOSLAVIA
A. Delalic
The United Nations Commission Of Experts formed to investigate
war crimes and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia
recommended that any international court which may be formed should be
vested with jurisdiction over alleged contraventions of the doctrine of
command responsibility.552 The text formulated by the Experts was
incorporated with slight modification into the Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).553 This provided that the fact
that a crime punishable under the Statute was committed by a subordinate
"does not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had
reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had
done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
'554
The Secretary-General observed that this was consistent with court
decisions stemming from World War II which imposed criminal responsi-
bility on heads of State, government officials and persons acting in an
official capacity.5 The Secretary-General further noted that "imputed
responsibility" or "criminal negligence" arose in those instances in which a
superior knew or had reason to know of potential or past criminal conduct
and failed to take "necessary and reasonable steps" to prevent, repress or
552. See Final Report of the United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 780, 9 55-60 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994).
553. See United Nations Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory ot the Former Yugoslavia, 32
I.L.M. 1159, 1174, art. 7(3) (1993).
554. Id. at 55 (commentary).
555. Id.
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556punish the criminal conduct. A similar provision was incorporated into
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).557
In Delalic, defendant Esaid Landzo was alleged to have served as a
guard in the Celebici prison camp and was charged with killing, torture and
cruel treatment and willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to
• . 558
Serb internees. Two other defendants, Hazim Delic, assistant com-
mander of the camp 5 9 and Zdravko Mucic, commander of the Celebici
prison camp,' were charged with direct involvement as well as command"LI. 561
responsibility. The fourth defendant, Zejnic Delalic, also was accused of
command responsibility for the acts alleged in the indictment as a result of
his coordination of Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces in the Konjic region
and command of the First Tactical Group of the Bosnian Army."'
The decision noted that the touchstone of command responsibility
was a superior-subordinate relationship characterized by the capacity to
effectively control the actions of subordinates.5 63 This may be based on
either the formal legal authority or informal practical power to prevent or
to punish the crimes of subordinates. 564 This broad and flexible standard
was particularly required in situations such as the former Yugoslavia in
which the military command had broken down and had been replaced by
fluid and ill-defined structures95  In these decentralized and diffuse
military organizations, formal designation as a commander was not a
prerequisite for command responsibility.6 Conversely, the Court
556. Id. at 117.
557. See United Nations Security Counsel Resolution 955, 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1604-05, art. 6(3)
(1994).
558. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, 91 4-10 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.un.orglicty. The Celebici detention facility was located in the
village of Celebici which was located in the Konjic municipality in central Bosnia. Id. 3.
559. Id. $T 4, 11-18.
560. Id. 91 4, 21-28.
561. Id. 91 4, 21-28.
562. Id. I 4, 21-27.
563. Id. T 354. Criminal liability for command responsibility "may arise either out of the
positive acts of a superior, referred to as direct command responsibility, or from culpable
omissions, indirect command responsibility." Id.[ 333. The latter arises in those instances in
which there is a duty to prevent or to repress the unlawful conduct of subordinates. Id.
334.
564. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, 1 354 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.un.org/icty.
565. Id.
566. Id. T 370. The Tribunal abandoned the traditional view that staff officers could not be
held liable under the doctrine of command responsibility. See id. l 365-69. The Court
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cautioned that command liability should not be imposed upon individuals
567
with formal authority who lacked effective control. The duty of an
individual endowed with the formal or informal authority to curb criminal
conduct extended to his subordinates, as well as to those considered to be
under his control, such as military units operating within the superior's
territorial command, the residents of occupied territories and prisoners of
569
war.
The Court also ruled that the employment of the term "superior" in
Article 7(3), in juxtaposition with Article 7(2)'s affirmation of the criminal
responsibility of a "'Head of State,"' "'Government official' or 'respon-
sible Government official,"' indicated that criminal liability extended
beyond military commanders to encompass political leader and other
civilians in positions of authority." 9 The Tribunal noted that civilians were
liable in those instances in which they exercised a measure of control over
their subordinates analogous to that of military commanders.17" The Trial
Chamber interpreted the requirements of Article 7(3) in light of customary
international law and ruled that a superior possessed the requisite mens rea
to incur criminal responsibility in those instances in which: he possessed
actual knowledge, established through direct or circumstantial evidence,
that his subordinates were committing or about to commit crimes;..' or he
possessed information which, at a minimum, provided notice of the need
for an additional investigation in order to determine whether such crimes
had been committed or were about to be committed by subordinates.
72
The Court stressed that the doctrine of command responsibility did not
provide for strict liability.
5 73
The Trial Chamber made a subtle innovation in the law of command
responsibility by ruling that in the absence of direct knowledge that a
superior officer's constructive knowledge of the offenses could not be
presumed as a matter of law. 74 Instead, actual awareness must be
explained that a chief of staff lacking formal powers of command might be deemed to
possess "powers of control over the actions of subordinates." Id. T[ 370.
567. Id. 370.
568. Id. T$ 371-72, 378. Control was defined as the "material ability to prevent and to
punish the commission of offenses." Id. T1 378.
569. Id. T1 356.
570. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, 378 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), httpJ/www.un.org/icty.
571. Id. T1 383.
572. Id.
573. Id.
574. Id. T$ 384-86.
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established by the totality of circumstantial evidence.17 The Trial Chamber
enumerated various indicia listed by the Commission of Experts which
may be considered. These included the number, character, scope, duration
and time of the illegal acts; the number and type of troops involved; the
logistics and tactical tempo of the operation; the modus operandi of other
illegal acts; the officers and staff involved; and the location of the
commander at the time of the crimes.576
The "reason to know" standard was interpreted in accordance with
what the Trial Chamber considered to be the ordinary meaning of the
term.577 The Court elaborated that a superior only may be held criminally
responsible in those instances in which specific facts were available which
would provide notice of offenses.5 This information need not definitively
establish the commission of the delicts; it was sufficient that a superior was
placed on notice that an additional investigation was required to determine
whether offenses were being committed or were about to be committed by
subordinates5 79 The Trial Chamber stressed that this was the position of
customary international law at the time of the commission of the crimes
before the Court.580
The Trial Chamber explained that this notice standard was based on
the policy that the law should not condone a superior remaining willfully
unaware of the acts of his or her subordinates."1 A superior who
disregarded information within his or her actual possession which
compelled the conclusion that a criminal offense may be, or was about to
be committed, was guilty of a dereliction of duty. 82 What of a situation in
which a commander lacked information by virtue of a failure to supervise
subordinates? The Trial Chamber noted that the jurisprudence immedi-
ately following the Second World War affirmed the duty of commanders to
remain informed of the activities of their subordinates. However, in the
view of the Trial Chamber, the Geneva Protocol, which was deemed to
575. Id. [ 386.
576. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, T 386 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.un.org/icty.
577. Id. S[ 393.
578. Id.
579. Id.
580. Id. The Trial Chamber made no finding as to the present content of customary
international law. Id.
581. Id. 387.
582. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, T 387 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.un.org/icty.
583. Id. T1 388.
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reflect customary international law at the time of the offenses at issue in
Delalic, failed to provide for the imposition of liability in such cases.'84
The legal duty resting upon superior authorities required that they
take all necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the commission of
offenses."' In the event that such crimes already had been committed,
586there was a duty to punish the perpetrators. The Trial Chamber held that
the remedial actions required of superiors were so inextricably related to
the facts of each situation that it was unrealistic to attempt to provide a
specific legal standard."' The Court, however, stressed that a superior was
58M
obliged to take those measures which were within his powers. At the
same time that a commander was not required to undertake the impossi-
ble, the Tribunal took the innovative step of ruling without explanation
that the lack of formal legal competence to prevent or to repress a crime
did not constitute a complete defense.89
The Trial Chamber held that proof of causation was not an independ-
ent requirement for the imposition of command culpability.' 9° As a
conceptual matter, the Tribunal noted that there was an inherent causal
connection between a commander's failure to fulfill his duty to intervene
and the commission of war crimes by subordinates. 9' There also may be a
causal connection between the failure of an official to have punished past
crimes and future criminal conduct.592 However, the Chamber observed
that there was no causal connection "between an offense committed by a
subordinate and the subsequent failure of a superior to punish the
offense."5 93 This, according to the Trial Chamber, demonstrated the
584. Id. 11 391-92.
585. Id. T 394.
586. Id.
587. Id. 394.
588. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, [ 395 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://wwwoun.org/icty.
589. Id. The superior was required take measures that are within his "material possibility."
ld. "The lack of formal legal competence to take the necessary measures to prevent or
repress the crime in question does not necessarily preclude the criminal responsibility of the
superimr." Id.
590. Id. 398.
591. Id. 1 399.
592. Id. 1 400.
593. Id.
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absence of a causality requirement as an independent element of the
doctrine of superior responsibility. 94
The Tribunal concluded that Zejnil Delalic lacked authority over the
Celebici prison, camp commander or personnel and could not be convicted
under the doctrine of command responsibility. 95 Delalic had returned from
overseas and had devoted his considerable wealth to the Bosnian Muslim
cause. 9' He gradually gained authority and influence and, in May 1992, the
local civilian War Presidency appointed him to coordinate relations with
the Konjic Municipality Defense Forces. 97 Delalic's primary responsibility
was the provision of logistical support for various units of the armed
forces;s98 there was no evidence that he was in a command position or
599
exercised informal authority over the Celebici prison camp.
In July 1992, Delalic was appointed Commander of Tactical Group I
with authority over the military formations of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the
Konjic region. 6°° The Tribunal stressed that this was a temporary combat
formation which was comprised of roughly 1,200 troops and that Delalic
did not exercise territorial command in the region. ° The Court clarified
that no non-combat units were attached to the Tactical Group and that
Delalic was not authorized to issue orders to the commander of the
Celebici prison camp.6 2 The prosecution pointed out that Delic, in fact,
had issued two orders to the commander of the Celebici prison camp
directing that a three member commission should be established to
interrogate prisoners.603 However, the Trial Chamber ruled that Delalic
had been functioning as an intermediary for higher authorities and that
conveying these commands had not expanded the scope of his authority.
604
In sum, the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that Delalic exercised formal or informal authority over the Celebici
prison camp administration and guards and possessed the duty to prevent











603. Id. 91 692.
604. Id. 91 696-700.
2001]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
or punish criminal acts.60 5 Delalic likely possessed knowledge of events in
the camp; command culpability nevertheless could not be premised on
mere influence or persuasive power.607
The Trial Chamber imposed command responsibility on Zdravko
Mucic." The Tribunal noted that while it was uncertain whether Mucic
was a military commander or a civilian administrator, that his status was
not controlling since the term superior in the ICTY statute encompassed
civilian as well as military authorities.609 Formal appointment was an
important indicator of command authority, but the actual exercise of
authority and control over subordinates, in the absence of formal.... 610
appointment, was sufficient for the imposition of criminal culpability.
The defense stressed that there were no written or formal documents
recognizing that Mucic, was commander of the camp."" The Tribunal,
however, determined that Mucic was the acknowledged de facto head of
661the camp. 2 This was based on Mucic's statements and admissions,613 the614, 615
observations of detainees, 614 and journalists, his relations with other
616
officials, and, most importantly, Mucic's assertion of disciplinary control
over the guards.61' He also exercised his discretion to determine which
618 61Serbian prisoners would be released, transferred, or receive visitors.' 9 In
short, Mucic enjoyed the recognition, powers and functions of command. 620
605. Id. 703-04.




609. Id. 1 735.
610. Id. J 736.
611. Id. 739.
612. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, 737 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.un.org/icty.





618. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, $ 764 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.Ln.org/icty.
619. Id. 1 765.
620. Id. 1 750.
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Mucic conceded that he had been aware and had personally observed
621
that the guards under his command were committing crimes. Witnesses
corroborated that he was present during the interrogation and abuse of
612detainees. The Trial Chamber also observed that the crimes committed
in the Celebici prison camp had been so frequent and notorious that it
would have been impossible for Mucic not to have been aware or to have
heard about them.623 He nevertheless failed to take necessary and
appropriate measures to prevent or to punish crimes committed within the
6124Celebici camp. Mucic neglected to issue instructions to the guards
concerning the treatment of detainees, 62' failed to establish a system to
monitor or to punish violations of the international humanitarian law of626
war, and neither investigated nor punished the mistreatment of
detainees.627 The effectiveness of any protective orders which he may have
issued were limited by the fact that Mucic typically was absent from the
camp during the evening; the period in which detainees typically were
abused.628
Mucic was determined to have participated in the maintenance of
inhumane conditions and to have failed to prevent the violent acts of his
subordinates, thereby subjecting the detainees of the Celebici prison camp
to an atmosphere of terror.629 As a result, he was convicted of willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to the body or health of detain-
630
ees.
The Trial Chamber acquitted Hazim Delic of command responsibil-
ity.631 The Tribunal noted that the detainees viewed Delic as a formidable
figure who exercised substantial influence over the other guards in the632
camp. There was evidence that during Mucic's absence that Delic had
621. Id. $ 769.
622. Id.
623. Id. 770.
624. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, 770 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.un.org/icty.
625. Id. 773.
626. Id. T 770, 772,
627. Id. 772.
628. Id. 773.
629. Id. 1 1237.
630. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, 1237 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.un.org/icty.
631. Id. $ 810.
632. Id. 1 800.
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assumed control of the camp... and that he had issued orders to kill,
634
torture and beat inmates and had organized their interrogation. The
Trial Chamber concluded that the prosecution failed to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that Delic had been within the chain of command at the
Celebici prison camp with the power to issue orders to subordinates or to
prevent or to punish the criminal acts of subordinates. "' The Court
attributed his influence over the other guards to their fear of resisting the
demands of such an intimidating and morally malevolent individual.
6
In mitigation of Mucic's punishment, the Trial Chamber observed that
Celebici was established to detain Serbs whose loyalty to the newly-
established Bosnian State was in doubt."' The Konjic municipality was
strongly anti-Serbian and Mucic, a Croat, was understandably apprehen-
sive that the majority Muslim population might view him as sympathetic to
the Serbian cause. The Court recognized that considerations of self-
preservation likely prevented Mucic from taking stronger measures to
prevent the mistreatment of detainees. 63 There also was no evidence that
Mucic directly participated in torture and murder, despite the fact that he
was positioned to exercise unlimited and unrestrained power and
authority.64 In fact, there was an indication that he had saved some
detainees and had prevented the rape of a thirteen year old girl to whom
he subsequently had given money and had assisted to escape. 641 He also
implored the Bosnian government to provide food to feed detainees.6 42 The
Trial Chamber observed that in light of Mucic's restraint that his
transgressions might be viewed as a manifestation of human frailty rather
than venality; a failure and fear of exercising his authority to assist the
detainees of the Celebici prison camp.643
633. Id. 801.
634. Id. T9 804-05.
635. Id. 810.
636. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, 91 806 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http:llwww.un.org/icty. Essad Landzo was convicted of willful murder,
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury and of the brutal treatment of detainees.
Id. 1 1272.
637. Id. 1 1241.
638. Id. 91 1245.
639. Id.
640. Id. 1%91 1240,1248.
641. Id. 1 1247.
642. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, 91 1247 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http:/iwww.un.org/icty.
643. Id. 1 1248.
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The defense compared Mucic to Field Marshall von Leeb who had
been sentenced to three years in prison for having implemented the
Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.6 This authorized the summary execution
of civilians suspected of having attacked German troops as well as the
infliction of collective penalties on villages which were thought to have
harbored teroists.64 Von Leeb conveyed this directive through the chain
of command and set the slaughter in motion; he had no further involve-
ment in the killings.646
The Trial Chamber distinguished Mucic's degree of complicity, noting
647
that he had been closely involved in atrocities and abuse. According to
the Trial Chamber, Mucic had intentionally neglected to supervise his
subordinates thereby condoning and facilitating the abuse of detainees.
He absented himself from the camp in the evening hours in order to
position himself to later plead that he had been unaware of criminal
conduct.649 The Trial Chamber proclaimed that it would constitute "a
travesty of justice" as well as "an abuse of the concept of command
authority" to permit Mucic to rely on this calculated neglect of his duties in
mitigation of punishment. In fact, Mucic's conscious creation of an alibi
constituted a dereliction of an essential duty and comprised an aggravating
factor.65' On the basis of these facts, the Trial Chamber observed that the
652
three-year sentence meted out to von Leeb would be inadequate. The
Court also observed that in imposing a sentence that the gravity of Mucic's
offense must be considered, but that retribution should not constitute the
644. Id. 1249. See generally supra notes 302-15.
645. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, $ 1249 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.un.org/icty.
646. Id.




651. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. 96-21-T, 1250 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1998), http://www.un.org/icty.
652. Id. The Trial Chamber noted that, at trial, that Mucic had demonstrated a casual and
perfunctory attitude towards his duties in the Celebici prison camp. He also intimidated
witnesses and attempted to influence their testimony. The Tribunal observed that Mucic's
attitude during the proceedings mirrored the "casual and perfunctory attitude which he
displayed towards his duties in the Celebici prison-camp." Id. $ 1251.
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sole determining factor.63 He was convicted on seven counts and
sentenced to a concurrent term of seven years in prison.
In summary, Delalic both clarified and further confused the jurispru-
dence of command responsibility. The decision established that responsi-
bility may be imposed on civilians or members of the military exercising de
facto was well as de jure responsibility. As indicated by the discussions of
Mucic and Delic, de facto authority was measured by various indicia of
656
authority based on the totality of the circumstances. The touchstone was
whether an individual exercised effective control over subordinates rather
.• .- 657
than a formal title or designation. Mere influence or persuasive ability
was not sufficient. 658
The Trial Chamber also ruled that the knowledge standard was satis-
fied by either actual or constructive knowledge or specific information
which provided notice that additional inquires were required.619 This was a
relaxation of the gross negligent standard in Protocol I. 660 Constructive
knowledge was not presumed; instead it was to be determined by
circumstantial evidence, 66' The Trial Chamber refused to recognize that
superiors possessed an affirmative duty to inform themselves of criminal
662
conduct. Proof of causation was not an independent element of
command responsibility.63 The decision further diverged from the
prevailing standard by articulating that a commander's obligation to take
reasonable and necessary remedial measures, while dependent on the facts
of each situation,6 was not circumscribed by the scope of an individual's
653. Id. 1252.
654. Id. 91 1285 (Judgment). Id. 91 1252. A commander's abuse of his or her position may be
considered an aggravating factor. At the same time, it might be mitigating factors that a
superior acted to alleviate harm, was distant from the scene of the crime and that his
awareness was based on constructive knowledge. Id. 91 1220. A defendant would not be
sentenced for both command responsibility and for participating in an offense. See id. 911
1221-23.
655. See supra notes 563-68 and accompanying texts.
656. See supra notes 613-20 and accompanying texts.
657. See supra notes 566-67 and accompanying texts.
658. See supra notes 635-36 and accompanying texts.
659. See supra notes 577-80 and accompanying texts.
660. See supra notes 524-25, 571-84 and accompanying texts.
661. See supra notes 574-76 and accompanying texts.
662. See supra notes 583-84 and accompanying texts.
663. See supra notes 590-594 and accompanying texts.
664. See supra notes 585-87 and accompanying texts.
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formal power and authority. 66' At a minimum, a commander was required
to issue cautionary orders, to establish a system to monitor violations and
66to investigate and to punish war crimes.
B. Blaskic, Aleksovski and Kordic
In Blaskic, General Tihomir Baskic, former commander of the Croa-S . 667
tian armed forces headquarters in central Bosnia, was convicted of
various offenses, including command responsibility for the death,
destruction, cruel and inhuman treatment and forced departure of the
Muslim population of the Lasva Valley and adjacent municipalities as well
as the pillage and plunder of dwellings, personal property and religious
monuments.6
The decision elaborated on the jurisprudence of command responsi-
bility, reiterating that commanders may incur legal liability for crimes
committed by individuals who were not their direct subordinates over
whom they exercised "effective control."669 The Court affirmed that the
essential factor was the "material ability" to control combatants through
the issuance of orders or disciplinary action or through the submission of
reports to commanders authorized to undertake the "proper measures."
670
The knowledge of superiors, as noted in Delalic, may not be pre-
sumed. Instead such awareness must be established through either direct
or circumstantial evidence. 6 1 The Trial Chamber, however, diverged from
their brethren in Delalic and ruled that a commander was required to
exercise due diligence in the exercise of his duties. 672 Ignorance was not a
defense in those instances in which the absence of knowledge resulted
from a failure to take affirmative steps to remain informed of the actions
of subordinates. 6 In such circumstances, a commander "had reason to
know within the meaning of the Statute.
674
665. See supra notes 588-89 and accompanying texts.
666. See supra notes 631-34 and accompanying texts.
667. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, 9, 112 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.unorg.icty.
668. Id. l 754.
669. Id. 9$ 301.
670. See id. 302.
671. Id. 9 307.
672 Id. 332. See supra notes 583-84 and accompanying texts.
673. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, $1 332 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.unorg.icty.
674. Id.
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The Trial Chamber also clarified that the reasonableness of a com-
mander's remedial measures to prevent and to punish criminal conduct
was based on the extent of his effective control."' For instance, a
commander with limited authority may discharge this obligation by
16
reporting the matter to competent authorities. In addition, an accused
may not compensate for his failure to prevent criminal conduct by later
punishing his subordinates; these are complementary rather than
alternative obligationsi 77 A failure to punish, where causally related to the
commission of subsequent crimes, may constitute the offense of instiga-
tion.6" However, as noted in Celebici, this causal connection need not be
679
established in order to constitute liability for command responsibility.
In analyzing the facts, the Trial Chamber observed that, in 1992, that
the Croatian military initiated a campaign of discrimination and harass-
ment against the Muslim residents of the Lasva Valley in order to insure
demographic dominance in central Bosnia.680 This escalated, on April 16,
1993, when General Blaskic issued an order instructing troops under his
command to enter and to occupy Ahmici and three other villages in
anticipation of an alleged attack by Muslim forces.68 The Court, however,
stressed the lack of evidence of an ongoing or imminent Muslim military
initiative.682 The Croatian commandos encountered no resistance in the
villages: 68' civilians were collected and shot at point blank range,
6M
685dwellings and stables were set ablaze, and religious schools and Mosques
were destroyed. 686
Blaskic was determined to have exercised authority over the special





679. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, 339 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.unorg.icty.
680. See id. ll 366-67, 370, 380-83.
681. Id. 1 435 437.
682. Id. [ 407-09.
683. Id. [ 409.
684. Id. [ 414.
685. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, 412, 418 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.unorg.icty.
686. Id. % 419-23.
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based on the territorial nature of his authority6 7 and the assimilation of
these combatants into his command.6 The Trial Chamber also pointed to
the coordinated character of these systematic attacks against Muslim
civilians6 9 which indicated that they had been undertaken in accordance
with orders issued by the accused. 690
The regular Croatian forces (HVO) were indisputably within Blaskic's
chain of command."' The Military Police Fourth Battalion was attached toS • 692
Blaskic for specific combat missions. The evidence indicated that this
unit complied with Blaskic's orders, even when directed to cooperate with
international observers.69 ' Although Blaskic concededly lacked the power
to directly punish members of the Fourth Police Battalion, he was
obligated to contact the relevant unit officers as well as the higher
authorities in the Defense Department in the event of transgressions.694
Blaskic also was determined to have command of the Vitezovi special
military unit.9 The unit was formally subordinated to the Defense
Minister who, along with the commander of the Vitezovi, recognized
696Blaskic's authority. He issued orders to the unit on matters ranging from
organization to the conduct and management of troops.69 The Trial
Chamber also observed that the Vitezovi command could not have
planned, organized or obtained the explosives and artillery utilized in their
698
combat actions absent Blaskic's assistance.
The Court noted that Blaskic need not have possessed a clear criminal
intent to expel and to exterminate Muslim civilians in order to be found
criminally culpable. 699 The accused was well-aware from past reports that
687. Id. 45. Blaskic possessed the technological capacity to communicate with forces in
the field. Id. 448.
688. Id. 1 449-65. See generally 91 519-28.
689. Id. 91 467
690. Id. 91 469-72.
691. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, T1 517 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.unorg.icty.
692. Id. 919 459-60.
693. Id. 91 463.
694. Id. T 464. The obligation on the accused to report any abuse committed to the
competent authorities "sufficed ... to establish command responsibility." Id.
695. Id. 91 518.
696. Id. SS 527-28.
697. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, 1 522 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.unorg.icty.
698. Id. 991 529-30.
699. Id. 91 474.
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various units included troops with a history of committing war crimes and,
in fact, issued orders requiring the removal of these soldiers from
combat.7 ° However, Blaskic failed to insure the implementation of these
commands and wantonly and recklessly permitted the troops to participate
in operations against Muslim villages.""
Blaskic was informed of the atrocities within two to four days of their
occurrence.7 1 Yet, he failed to take reasonable and appropriate remedial
measures.7 0 3 Blaskic made no effort to contact the commander of the
Military Police, although he suspected that this unit had been involved in
the crimes. In addition, he neglected to seal off the area in order to
preserve evidence, request autopsies or to interview the victims.7 0 Blaskic
also refused to cooperate with international investigative efforts and,
instead, ordered an internal inquiry which, by his own admission, was
inadequate and incomplete. 7°6 A second investigation was initiated over a
year later which was never presented in court.17 Blaskic's sole prophylactic
measure was to issue various protective orders following the attack. 7°' The
Trial Chamber, however, noted that the directive prohibiting the burning
of homes, like the others, had been issued too late to assist the Muslim
victims.709 In the end, not a single member of Blaskic's command was
punished by Croatian military authorities for the crimes committed in the
Ahemici, Pirici, Santici and Nadioci villages.710
In sum, Blaskic ordered attacks that resulted in massacre.7I He never-
theless failed to take measures to prevent or to punish the crimes which he
reasonably knew were about to be, or had been, committed.' The military
assault directed by Blaskic next targeted civilians in other areas of the
700. Id.
701. Id.; but see id. $ 476.
702. Id. 479-81.
703. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, 477 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the





708. Id. $ 486.
709. ProsecutoT v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, 486-87 (Int'l CTim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.unorg.icty.
710. Id. 9 494.
711. Id. 9 495.
712. Id. 9 477.
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Lasva Valley and surrounding villages.713 In discussing the attacks on the
villages of Loncari and Ocehnici, the Trial Chamber noted that these
assaults, like those launched against the villages in the municipalities of
Vitez and Kiseijak, involved "unlawful confinement of the men of fighting
age, rounding up then deportation of the elderly, women and children.
intimidation of civilians by murder and beating, and systematic torching
and pillage of homes and farms., 14 The Trial Chamber stressed that in
these actions that Blaskic deployed forces which "he knew, according to
his own testimony, were, at least in part, difficult to control, and at the very
time when they were being called into question for the perpetration of
earlier crimes.
'715
Blaskic also was aware that Muslims were being detained by troops
under his control within the area of his territorial command."' The
detainees allegedly were deployed as human shields, compelled to dig
trenches and subjected to physical and mental violence and inhuman
treatment, including the deprivation of food and water."' The Trial
Chamber held that Blaskic had reason to know of this abuse since two of
the facilities staffed and commanded by his troops were located adjacent
or near his headquarters and his subordinates must have discussed theS 718
conditions in these complexes. Blaskic also conceded that he was aware
that women and children were being detained at a primary school where
719
the Vitezovi unit was billeted. Yet, the Trial Chamber observed that
Blaskic seemed indifferent to the fate of the detainees and failed to meet
his obligation of reasonable diligence in pursuit of information on their
conditions of detention. °
The Trial Chamber noted that it might be considered in mitigation
721
that a commander only possessed constructive knowledge. Yet, in this
case, Blaskic held "more than a constructive knowledge of the crimes"
• 722
which he may have ordered, but certainly condoned. In addition, in cases
713. See id. 579. See also id. 499, 559-60, 588-92. 623, 661.
714. Id. 573.
715. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, 561 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.unorg.icty.
716. Id. 919 722, 723.
717. See id. 1$ 680-82.
718. Id. 730-31.
719. See id. 732.
720. Id. T 733.
721. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, 788 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.unorg.icty.
722. Id.
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like Blaskic, in which a commander failed to prevent a crime or to punish
the perpetrators, the Trial Chamber determined that the accused merited a
heavier sentence than the subordinates who carried out the crime. 3 The
commander's actions in these cases conveyed a measure of tolerance or
even approval which created the risk of contributing to the continuance of
724 72
such offenses. Blaskic was sentenced to forty-five years in prison.
In summary, Blaskic imposed liability on commanders who exercised
both formal authority and effective control over combatants.72 The latter
was measured by a range of factors, the most important of which was the
capacity to impose some form of discipline. 727 Blaskic also held that the
knowledge component required either actual or constructive awareness or
a failure to monitor the maneuvers of subordinates. The obligation to
undertake reasonable remedial measures varied in accordance with the
nature and scope of a superior's authority over a subordinate. 9
In a related prosecution, Zlato Aleksovski was convicted of command
responsibility for the mistreatment of Muslim internees at the Kaonik
detention facility in the Lasva Valley. 73° The case arose out of the Croatian
Defense Council's detention and confinement of nearly four hundred
Muslim men at the Kaonik compound for roughly two weeks in January
1993.731
In discussing command culpability, the Court observed that the doc-
trine of superior responsibility was not based on the imposition of liability
for the acts of others, but was premised on the failure of an official to fulfill
his obligation to prevent or to punish criminal conduct. 73' This extended to
military as well as to civilian authorities who exercised a degree of
command and control which was similar to that of their military breth-
733rien.
723. Id. 1 789.
724. Id.
725. Id. 1 790 (Disposition).
726. See supra note 669 and accompanying text.
727. See supra note 670 accompanying text.
728. See supra notes 671-74 and accompanying texts.
729. See supra notes 675-76 and accompanying texts.
730. See Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. 11-95-141-T, ' 1, 233 (Int'l Cnim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia 1999), http://www.un.org/icty.
731. Id. T 23.
732. Id. 1 72.
733 Id. 11 73, 75.
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The Tribunal observed that hierarchical power was the touchstone of
command responsibility.14 A civilian may be characterized as a superior in
those instances in which he possessed the de jure or de facto capacity to
735issue orders to prevent an offense and to punish the perpetrators. A
civilian authority, however, need not possess the authority to sanction
analogous to a military official; this would unduly limit the scope of the
736doctrine of command culpability so as to exclude most civilians. As a
result, it was sufficient that a civilian official possessed the ability to
transmit reports to the appropriate authorities who were likely to
investigate and, where justified, to initiate disciplinary or even criminal
sanctions.737
The Trial Chamber followed Delalic and Blaskic and was reluctant to
presume knowledge.138 The Chamber, however, stressed that an individ-
ual's superior position was a "significant indicium" that he was aware of
the crimes committed by his subordinates.73 9 The weight to be accorded
this "indicium" depended, in part, on geographical and temporal
circumstances.' 4 Thus, the commission of a crime in the immediate
proximity of a superior would "establish a significant indicium that he had
knowledge of the crime," particularly in the event that it was repeatedly
committed. 41
The Trial Chamber concluded that Aleksovski , whatever his formal
title, was accorded the status of prison warden.742 Despite the fact that
there was no written designation, the evidence demonstrated that
Aleksovski had been officially appointed by the Ministry of Justice and
that he had identified himself as warden to various witnesses. 743 The
734. Id. J 78.
735. Id.
736. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. It-95-14/1-T, J 78 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1999), http://www.un.org/icty. But see supra note 570 and accompanying text.
737. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. It-95-14/1-T, 78 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1999), http://www.un.org/icty. "Although the power to sanction is the
indissociable corollary of the power to issue orders within the military hierarchy; it does not
apply to the civilian authorities." Id. T 78.
738. Id. T 79.
739. Id. T 80.
740. Id.
741. Id.
742. Id. T 93.
743. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. It-95-14/1-T, 1 93 (Int'l Crirn. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 1999), http://www.un.org/icty.
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Travnik military tribunal, which possessed jurisdiction over Kaonik, also
recognized Aleksovski's formal position in various communications.
There was no clear consensus as to whether Aleksovski was a civilian
or a member of the military.7 4 The Trial Chamber, however, was clear that
Aleksovski had acted as de facto head of the prison: he established the
institutional rules, received representatives of international and European
monitoring groups and signed receipts for materials supplied by humani-
tarian organizations.14 Aleksovski also issued orders for the transfer of
prisoners and assumed responsibility for prison conditions, hygiene and
the health and welfare of detainees.747
Was Aleksovski liable for mistreatment within the compound? The
Trial Chamber determined that Aleksovski had exercised effective control
over the prison guards, who were members of the military police' 4i The
guards complied with Aleksovski's orders.749 He also was authorized to
initiate disciplinary or criminal proceedings against guards by filing
complaints with the military police commander and president of the
Travnik military tribunal. 70 The Trial Chamber importantly held that the
fact that the guards were concurrently subjected to another authority did
not detract from the fact that the accused was their superior within the
confines of the Kaonik prison. 5' On the other hand, there was no evidence
that the accused was positioned to issue orders to the HVO soldiers who
entered the compound to remove detainees."2 Aleksovski, however, could
753initiate disciplinary or criminal proceedings by contacting their superiors.
The Trial Chamber, in reviewing the evidence, concluded that the
defendant was not liable for failing to prevent or to punish the acts
744. Id.
745. Id. 1100.
746. Id. 1 101.
747. Id.
748. Id. 1 103.
749. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. It-95-14/1-T, 91 104 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 1999), http://www.un.org/icty.
750. Id. 1 105.
751. Id. 9 106.
752. Id. 19 108-09.
753. Id. 1 110.
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perpetrated by the HVO,5 including the utilization of Muslim detainees to
dig trenches or to serve as human shields outside of the camp.755
The accused had been resident inside the prison for some weeks and,
in the view of the Trial Chamber, must have been aware of the continual
756ill-treatment of detainees. He conceded in a conversation that some
guards whose relatives had been killed during combat tended to exact
revenge on the detainees. 57 The Trial Chamber concluded that Aleksovski
had been aware of the rules of the international humanitarian law and had
been apprised of the physical and psychological abuse in the Kaonik
compound. Yet, he took no measures to prevent or punish these crimes:
he failed to submit reports documenting assaults to the military police
commander or to the president of the Travnik military tribunal.7 9 In fact,
rather than curbing crime, the accused, at times, was present during the
abuse of internees,760 abuse which the Trial Chamber characterized as an
"outrage upon personal dignity" and "degrading or humiliating treat-
mient. ,
7 6 1
As for the harsh conditions of confinement, Aleksovski was deter-
mined to have neither harbored an intent to create or to condone this
762deprived and dilapidated atmosphere. On the contrary, Aleksovski was
found to have taken all available steps to ameliorate these conditions,
including the distribution of blankets and the provision of hygienic
conditions of confinement. 6' The Trial Chamber also concluded that the
overpopulation and inadequate resources resulted from circumstances
beyond Aleksovski's control.764
The Appellate Chamber increased Aleksovski's sentence from two
and a half765 to seven years in prison. 766 The Court stressed that while
754. Id. 119.
755. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. It-95-14/1-T, T 134 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 1999), http://www.un.org/icty. Aleksovski's authorization was not
required to remove the detainees. He could, however, object on health grounds. Id. 91 135.
756. Id. T 114.
757. Id.
758. Id.
759. Id. $ 117.
760. Id. See also id. T 224.
761. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. It-95-14/1-T, 91 228 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 1999), http-//www.un.org/icty.
762. Id. T1 219.
763. Id.
764. Id.
765. Id. 1 244.
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Aleksovski occupied a secondary position in the command structure, that
he was nonetheless the commander of the prison compound and could
have prevented and punished the illicit conduct.16' Aleksovski did not
merely tolerate these delicts; his direct participation in the selection of
detainees to be used in digging trenches and as human shields encouraged
the continued commission of these crimes.768
Aleksovski clarified that command responsibility was applicable to
both military and civilian officials769 exercising de facto as well as de jure
authority. 70 The Trial Chamber also affirmed that de facto authority was to
be measured by various factors, the most important of which was the
capacity to prevent and to punish an offense or to report disciplinary•• 771
violations to competent authorities. However, the Trial Chamber
suggested that the latter was not controlling in those instances in which an
official lacked the capacity to issue binding orders and other indicia of
authority. The Court was reluctant to impute knowledge, but ruled that
command position was an important factor to consider in adjudging
constructive knowledge.773 In addition, Aleksovski held that multiple
individuals at varying levels of the administrative hierarchy may be held
concurrently liable under the doctrine of command culpability.
774
The effective control standard for de jure and de facto authority was
affirmed in Kordic.77 ' Dario Kordic was Vice-President of the separatist
Croatian Republic of Hercg Bosna and President of the Croatian
Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the principal Bosnian
Croat political party.776 Kordic was charged with responsibility as a
superior for the acts of the Croatian Defense Council in the ethnic
cleansing of Central Bosnia.77 Kordic regularly appeared in a military
uniform, was referred to as "Colonel" and was surrounded by military
766. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, 191 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia 2000), http://www.un.org/icty.
767. Id. 184.
768. Id. 183.
769. See supra note 733 and accompanying text.
770. See supra note 735 and accompanying text.
771. See supra notes 746-47 and accompanying texts.
772. See supra notes 752-55 and accompanying texts.
773. See supra notes 738-41 and accompanying texts.
774. See supra note 751 and accompanying text.
775. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 2001), http://www.un.or/icty.
776. Id. T 5(d).
777. Id. 5(f), 520.
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guards."" He issued orders for military equipment, supplies and the
appointment of personnel7' represented the Croatian forces in negotia-
tions with United Nations forces,780 and exercised control over roads and
roadblocks78 ' and prisoners.112 Most importantly, Kordic participated in
planning military operations,7 3 was present during attacks,' and provided
political authorization for the ethnic cleansing of the Lasva Valley."" The
Trial Chamber concluded that despite Kordic's "tremendous influence and
power" in Central Bosnia786 and issuance of orders and exercise of
authority over military forces, that he was a civilian who was not part of
the formal military command structure.787 He also lacked the central
requisite of command, the effective control to prevent or to punish
offenses.7 8 The Trial Chamber, in acquitting Kordic of command
responsibility, stressed "that great care must be taken in assessing the
evidence to determine command responsibility in respect to civilians, lest
an injustice is done. 7 89
C. The ICTY Jurisprudence of Command Responsibility
The Appellate Chamber in Delalic summarized and clarified the
jurisprudence of command responsibility under the ICTY Statute.790 The
Chamber affirmed that command responsibility under Article 7(3)
encompassed both de jure and de facto authority 9exercised by civilian as
778. Id. 546, 556.
779. Id. IT 553-54.
780. Id. 1 539.
781. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, 1 588 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 2001), http://www.un.or/icty.
782 Id. I 589.
783. Id. IT 577-86, 656, 761.
784. Id. 91 726.
785. Id. 631, 642.
786. Id. 838.
787. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, 1 839 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 2001), http://www.un.or/icty.
788. Id. 91 841.
789. Id. 1 840.
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well as military authorities.7 2 Central in determining command responsibil-
ity was the effective control to prevent or to punish criminal conduct79"3
rather than formal position. T9 A Court, however, was free to presume,
pending proof to the contrary, that an individual with official authority
wielded effective control.7 95 The de facto superior is required to exercise
"substantially similar powers of control over subordinates" as de jure
authorities7
The concept of command responsibility was based on the notion of
direct or indirect hierarchical control.797 The perpetrator was not required
to be part of a subordinate unit within a direct and formal chain of
command.' 9s The Appellate Chamber stressed that the issue was not
whether the accused was the direct or formal subordinate of the accused,
but whether the accused was "senior" in "some sort of formal or informal
hierarchy to the perpetrator. "7 99 The exercise of effective control to
prevent or to punish crimes was the "minimum requirement for the
recognition of the superior-subordinate relationship" which typically
entailed a subordinate relationship."s° The Appellate Chamber recognized
that there well might be a scenario in which an individual exercised
effective control over a combatant of equal rank. However, the Chamber
noted that the doctrine of command responsibility extended legal liability
792. Id. 195. The term command normally means powers that attach to a military
supcrior while the term control may encompass powers exercised by civilian leaders. The
latter has been accepted as part of the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. Id. 1 196.
793. Id. I1T 197-98.
794. Id. 1 197.
795. Id. The actual exercise of authority in the absence of formal appointment is sufficient
for the purpose of incurring criminal responsibility provided that the de facto superior
exercises actual power of control. Id. 9 206. The Appellate Chamber approvingly pointed
to the Delalic Court's determination that Mucic exercised de facto authority as commander
or warden of the Celebici camp. The Court relied on a range of factors including Mucic's
own admissions, his intervention to protect detainees, statements by co-defendants,
evidence that Mucic arranged for the transfer and classification and possessed the power to
release detainees. Id. 206.
796. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 197 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 2001), http://www.un.org/icty.
797. Id. 1251.
798. Id. I1T 251,254.
799. Id. 303.
800. Id. Title or position is not dispositive; the issue is the actual authority or control
exercised by the accused. Id. 91 306.
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to those in authoritative positions and was not applicable to situations of
equal authority.801
"Substantial influence" which does not amount to effective control,
meaning the material ability to prevent or to punish subordinate offenders,
was not sufficient to establish command culpability.02 The Appellate
Chamber also clarified that territorial commanders possessed a unique
obligation under the international humanitarian law of war towards
individuals who were not their subordinates and over whom they may
exercise mere influence. 83
The mental element of command responsibility entailed either actual
knowledge or reason to know.'04 The Appellate Chamber stated that the
latter required that a superior possess "some general information" which
would "put him on notice of possible unlawful acts by his subordinates. '" 805
This might be written or oral and was not required to assume the form of a
specific report."s° The Appellate Chamber broadly interpreted the requisite
standard to encompass an awareness of facts such as that subordinate
soldiers were poorly trained, possessed violent or unstable characters, or
had been drinking. 87 The relevant information only was required to have
been provided or available to the superior; it was not necessary that a
commander actually possessed the material or had "actually acquainted
himself with the information."" This mental element must be established
in each case and may not be imputed to the accused; the Chamber noted
that the latter would involve the imposition of strict liability. 9
801. Id. $1 303. The Trial Chamber concluded that, despite Delalic's position of deputy
commander of the camp, that he had not exercised actual authority in the sense of having
powers to prevent or to punish and, therefore, was not a superior or commander for
purposes of Article 7(3) of the ICTY. Id. 91 299. Delic's influence was attributable to the
guards' fear of an intimidating and morally delinquent individual. id. 91 308.




805. Id. % 238.
806. Id.
807. Id.
808. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 238 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 2001), http://www.un.org/icty.
809. Id. 91 239. The Appeals Chamber "would not describe superior responsibility as a
vicarious liability doctrine, insofar as vicarious liability may suggest a form of strict imputed
liability." Id.
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The Appellate Court did not fully address the obligation to take nec-
essary and reasonable measures." ' The Trial Chambers generally adopted
the position that the duty to prevent and to punish criminal conduct varied
with the facts and circumstances of each case."" The scope of this
obligation was dependent on the formal authority and informal capacity of
the accused.; a lack of formal legal competence to take the necessary
measures did not necessarily constitute a defense."' As a result, it was
deemed unrealistic to establish set standards. 83 The fact that a perpetrator
was subject to concurrent authority did not exonerate a lower-level official
from command culpability114 and there was no requirement that causation
should be independently established . 5
The Appellate Chamber, determined that the trial court in Delalic did
not give sufficient weight to the gravity of the offenses committed by
Mucic and that, as a result, that Mucic's seven year concurrent sentence
did not adequately punish the totality of his conduct.'s 6 The Chamber
made several observations which likely will guide future sentencing in
cases of command culpability. The Court clarified that there was no
presumption that the criminal conduct of a superior was "inherently less
grave" than the responsibility of a subordinate perpetrator."' The primary
810. See supra note 585 and accompanying text.
811. See supra note 587 and accompanying text.
812. See supra notes 589, 675-76 and accompanying texts. The trial chamber in Kordic, in
reviewing prevailing authorities ruled that a commander is obligated to take measures that
"practically within his powers and do not hang on his formal legal ability to take them."
Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, 441 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 2001), http://www.un.or/icty. The trial chamber noted that in assessing "whether
a superior failed to act, the Trial Chamber will look beyond formal competence to his
actual capacity to take measures." Id. T 443. A superior will be deemed to have discharged
his duty to prevent or to punish "if he uses every means in his powers to do so." Id. $ 445.
813. See supra note 587 and accompanying text. There was language suggesting that a lack
of formal legal competence was not a complete defense. See supra note 589 and
accompanying text.
814. See supra note 751 and accompanying text.
815. See supra notes 590-94 and accompanying texts.
816. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21 -A, 755 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 2001), http://www.un.org/icty. The standard governing sentencing is that the
penalty must accurately recognize the gravity of the offense and must reflect the totality of
the accused's criminal conduct. Id. 9 769.
917. Id. % 735 (emphasis omitted). The Appellate Chamber was critical of the trial court's
failure to consider the impact of Mucic's ongoing failure to exercise his duties of
supervision on the atmosphere of lawlessness in the camp. Id. 740. The uniform sentence
of seven years also indicated that the Trial Chamber neglected to consider the gravity of the
various underlying offenses. Id. 9 741-42.
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consideration in adjudging the appropriate penalty for command
culpability was the seriousness of the offense."18 This was comprised of two
factors: the seriousness of the delict which the superior failed to prevent or
to punish; 19 and the character of the commander's misconduct."'° The
Court clarified that although active and concrete involvement in criminal
conduct may aggravate a commander's culpability,82' that the lack of direct
engagement does not reduce liability for failing to prevent or to punish
812
criminal offenses. An ongoing failure to prevent or to punish delicts
implicitly encouraged subordinates to believe that they could commit
additional crimes with impunity and was considered of "significantly
greater gravity than isolated incidents of such failure."
823
The Appellate Chamber also ruled that in those instances in which the
same conduct resulted in conviction for both command responsibility and
direct involvement in a crime that this aggravated a commander's criminal
culpability.1 However, a defendant only was to be punished once for the
821
same act. Unspecified acts which were named in the indictment, but were
not established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial may not be considered
8126
at sentencing. The Appellate Court clarified that the Trial Chamber
possessed the discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentencing
and the only limitation was that the sentence "reflect the totality of the
accused's criminal conduct., 827 A defendant convicted of various crimes
thus ordinarily should receive a lengthier sentence than an individual





822. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, 737 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia 2001), http://www.un.org/icty.
823. Id. 739. Mucic's consistent failure to act in relation to the conditions and unlawful
conduct within the camp must have had such an encouraging effect. Id.
824. Id. 11 745-46. The Appellate Chamber noted that Mucic's sentence of seven years did
not reflect his direct responsibility for the inhuman conditions prevailing in the camp as
well as his superior responsibility for the atmosphere of terror created by the guards over
whom he exercised authority. Id. 746. The Appellate Chamber also pointed to the
disparity between the seven year sentence imposed on Aleksovski and the punishment
meted out to Mucic for much more serious conduct. Id. 759.
825. Id. 1 769.
826. Id. IT 762, 765.
827. Id. 1 769.
828. Id. 1 771.
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to determine that Mucic's altruistic acts did not significantly mitigate his
sentence in light of the fact that as commander that he had been in a
position to control and to prevent acts of violence in the camp and, instead,
829had absented himself during the evening hours.
In summary, the ICTY decisions importantly contributed to expand-
ing the doctrine of command culpability to civilians and to military officials
exercising de facto as well as de jure authority °30 A range of factors might
be considered in establishing de facto authority.3 However, the capacity to
directly or indirectly prevent and to punish criminal conduct was central to
the imposition of command responsibility.8" There must be at least a loose
superior and subordinate relationship, but this does not require a rigid
organizational chain of command."' Mere influence was not sufficient to
establish command liability.834
The Appellate Chamber in Delalic ruled that the standard for criminal
intent was knowledge or a generalized notice of possible criminal
conduct, 35thus rejecting the Blaskic requirement of a duty to exercise due
diligence in investigating the conduct of combatants. Knowledge must be
established in each case and was not to be imputed to the accused .8' The
scope of remedial action remained uncertain and was to be adjudged on a
case-by-case basis in accordance with the scope of a commander's forma
and informal power.838 As for sentencing, the Appellate Chamber clarified
that a conviction and sentence for command responsibility should reflect
both the gravity of the commander's conduct and of the underlying
offense.8 A continuing failure to intervene to control or to punish
criminal conduct encouraged such illegalities and constituted an aggravat-
ing factor.4 In addition, a conviction for both command culpability and
829. Id. 776. The Appellate Chamber suggested that deterrence and retribution were the
most important factors to be considered in sentencing; and that rehabilitation should not be
accorded undue weight. Id. 1 806.
830. See supra notes 790-91 and accompanying texts.
831. See supra notes 745-47 and accompanying texts.
832. See supra notes 791-94 and accompanying texts.
833. See supra notes 797-800 and accompanying texts.
834. See supra note 802 and accompanying text.
835. See supra notes 804-09 and accompanying texts.
836. See supra notes 672-74 and accompanying texts.
837. See supra note 809 and accompanying text.
838. See supra notes 795-800 and accompanying texts.
839. See supra notes 803-05 and accompanying texts.
840. See supra note 823 and accompanying text.
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direct participation in criminal conduct may aggravate a defendant's
criminal punishment.4'
D. Kambanda and Akayesu
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda recognized the
principle of command responsibility in a guilty plea agreement with Jean
Kambanda, the former Prime Minister of the interim government of
842Rwanda. Kambanda served as head of the twenty member Hutu Council
of Ministers and exercised legal authority and effective control over
government officials, senior civil servants and military officers.84 ' During
Kambanda's tenure, the government launched a sustained and systematic
attack against the minority Tutsi population, exterminating hundreds of
thousands of civilians. Kambanda acknowledged that he participated in
meetings of the Council of Ministers and other high-level gatherings at
which the massacres were discussed and monitored.845 He also conceded
that, in May 1994, he had disregarded a plea to intervene to protect
children at a hospital who had survived a massacre; the children were
subsequently killed." In the plea agreement, Kambanda acknowledged
that he failed to fulfill "his duty to ensure the safety of the children and the
population of Rwanda.
' '4 7
Kambanda conceded that he knew or should have known that persons
for whom he was responsible were engaged in massacring the Tutsi and
that he had failed to prevent these acts or to punish the perpetrators.'4 He
admitted that he had witnessed the massacres of Tutsi and had been
apprised of these killings from the reports of local leaders and cabinet
discussions.849 The Trial Chamber ruled that Kambanda's abuse of his
authority and of the trust of the civilian population constituted an
aggravating factor8' ° and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
5
1
841. See supra note 824 and accompanying text.
842. Prosecutor v. Kambanda, No. ICTR 97-23-8, 39 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda 1998),
http://www.un.org/ictr.
843. Id. 39(i).
844. Id. 39 (i).
845. id. 39 (iii).
846. Id. 1 39 (ix).
847. Id.
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In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber convicted Jean Paul Akayesu, the
bourgmestre or head of the Taba Commune, of genocide and crimes
852
against humanity. The bourgmestre was vested with power over every
aspect of life, including the economy, medical care, safety and security and
the utilization of land and other resources. Akayesu also possessed wide-
ranging de facto authority; the bourgmestre was described by the Trial
Chamber as a parental figure who was consulted on personal problems and
854
concerns.
In a brief discussion of command responsibility, the Trial Chamber
rejected a strict liability standard, explaining that criminal intent was the
moral foundation of the criminal law.81' The Chamber accordingly
reasoned that it was entirely proper to impose liability on officials
manifesting a malicious intent or a degree of negligence amounting to
acquiescence or even malicious intent. 85 This standard would appear to
preclude simple negligence or the imposition of an affirmative duty to
monitor the activities of combatants or an obligation to inquire into the
activities of units in the field .
The Trial Chamber also observed that the imposition of command
responsibility on civilians for the conduct of armies in the field remained
contentious and controversial. 5 8 According to the Chamber, this should be
assessed on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether the accused
possessed the actual power to take all "necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent the commission of the alleged crimes or to punish the
perpetrators thereof."8 9
The Trial Chamber determined that Akayesu was responsible for
maintaining law and order in the Taba Commune.8 6 He initially opposed
852. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR 96-4-T, 139 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda 1998),
http://www.un.org/ictr. Rwanda was divided into 11 prefectures, each of which was
governed by a prefect. The prefectures were further subdivided into communes which were
under the authority of bourgmestres. The bourgmestre of each commune was appointed by
the President of the Republic, upon the recommendation of the Minster of the Interior. Id.
at 4.
853. Id. at 19.
854. Id. at 20.
855. Id. at 95-96.
856. Id. at 96.
857. See supra notes 811-12 and accompanying texts.
858. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR 96-4-T, 96 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda 1998),
http://www.un.org/ictr.
859. Id.
860. Id. at 132.
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the activities of the Hutu armed militia in the Taba Commune.8 61 Akayesu
later changed course and cooperated with these combatants and had
reason to know, and in fact knew, that murder, mutilation and sexual
violence were occurring on or near the premises of his offices in the bureau
communal.862 Yet, once having aligned himself with the militia, Akayesu
took no measures to prevent these atrocities or to punish the perpetra-
tors. 63
The Trial Chamber determined that although the accused possessed a
superior and subordinate relationship with members of the armed local
militia who were resident at his headquarters, that he did not exercise this
control in relation to those armed units who were the principle perpetra-
tors of murder and sexual violence in the commune. 64 The Trial Chamber
thus chose not to rely on command culpability. The judges instead pointed
to the fact that Akeyasu had encouraged criminal conduct through "his
presence, his attitude and his utterances" and held him liable for aiding
and abetting in the preparation or execution of killings and the infliction of
serious bodily harm. 5
In sum, the ICTR recognized, but failed to fully develop or to apply
the notion of command culpability.866 Despite reluctance to impose
criminal culpability on civilian officials,8 67 the Trial Chamber held
Kambanda liable for the acts of military units.16' Defendant Akayesu
exercised control over the units based at his headquarters, but was deemed
to have lacked hierarchical control over the armed militia distant from his
base of operations. 6 ' The Court avoided an analysis of command
culpability and convicted Akayesu of the less complex and controversial
crime of aiding and abetting sexual violence and killing.
87 0
861. Id.
862. Id. at 129.
863. Id. at 132.
864. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, No. ICTR 96-4-T, 96 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Rwanda 1998),
http://www.un.org/ictr.
865. Id. at 132-33.
866. See supra note 842 and accompanying text.
867. See supra notes 858-59 and accompanying texts. This position may appear to be a
retrograde step. However, it recognizes that high ranking civilian officials rarely possess
effective control over military units. Id. See Prosecutor v. Kordic, No. IT-95-1412-T (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 2001), http://www.un.or/icty.
868. See supra notes 848-51 and accompanying texts.
869. See supra note 864 and accompanying text.
870. See supra note 865 and accompanying text.
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VIII. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), of July
17, 1998, provides for command liability87' for genocide,8 2 crimes against
83874humanitys7' and enumerated war crimes. This provision was inspired by
the prosecutions in Celebici and Blaskic and, in turn, has encouraged
871
additional indictments for command culpability before the ICTY.
Article Twenty-eight states that a military commander, or individual
effectively acting as a military commander, shall be criminally responsible
for crimes committed by forces under his effective command and control
or effective authority and control.87' The latter provision provides for
responsibility by military leaders exercising de facto as well as de jure
control.8 77 The qualification that that these officials must "effectively"
exercise "effective command" or "effective authority" appear to limit
liability in both instances to military commanders who possess the material
capacity to control troops. 7" A commander shall be considered criminally
culpable who "either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit
such crimes.8 79 This language is directly drawn from the Geneva Protocol
8W0 and recognizes that command culpability is based on the failure to fulfill
an official duty and is not an imputation of liability for the acts of
subordinates. 8' Most problematic is the required intent standard. The
imposition of liability on a commander who knew of an offense appears to
8812provide for culpability based on knowledge. The "should have known
standard" likely encompasses constructive knowledge based upon
871. Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 28.
872. Id. art. 6.
873. Id. art. 7.
874. Id. art. 8.
875. See Bantekas, supra note 530, at 575.
876. Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 28.
877. See id.
878. See id.
879. Id. art. 28(1)(a).
880. Protocol I, supra note 519.
881. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, art. 25, n.12 A/Conf. 183/Add.1 (1998) reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 142 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed. 1998) [hereinafter Bassiouni].
882. See supra note 879 and accompanying text.
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circumstantial evidence. 883 The language "owing to the circumstances of
the time" was selected in preference to the narrower "owing to the
widespread commission of the offenses," indicating that the determination
of constructive knowledge was to be premised on a broad range of
factors."" The commentary to the Geneva Protocol, for instance, stipulates
that superiors are responsible for the content of reports and that absence
from headquarters does not absolve a commander from responsibilityi s
The commentary further provides that a commander cannot claim to be
unaware of the level of training in the law of war of officers or troops,
their character traits, the tactical situation, the means of attack being
deployed against a densely populated area, and the adequacy of
instructions relating to the treatment of prisoners or a lack of medical
services.m' The text notes that this information may enable an official to
conclude that a crime has been or is about to be committed.887
The Delalic decision stressed that the information available to an
official need not provide definitive proof and only must alert an official
that an additional investigation is required.M The commentary to the
Geneva Protocol also notes that while a commander may be uninformed of
developments, that a superior cannot absolve himself from liability by
deliberately avoiding knowledge of events and of the general context of
combat.889 The issue remains whether the information available to a
commander must merely suggest or is required to compel the conclusion
that a crime is, or may be committed.890 At the same, time, Delalic failed to
find a duty on commanders to affirmatively investigate a situation in the
absence of incriminating information." The latter standard was rejected
by the Trial Chamber in Blaskic and would appear to be a future point of
contention under the ICC.89
The military commander is culpable in the event that he fails to take
all necessary and reasonable measures within his power to prevent or
883. See id.
884. Bassiouni, supra note 881, art. 25(a).
885. See Commentary, supra note 524, at 1014.
886. Id.
887. Id.
888. See supra notes 578-80, 790 and accompanying texts.
889. See Commentary, supra note 524, at 1014.
890. See supra notes 524-25, 578-79 and accompanying texts. See infra notes 905-09 and
accompanying texts.
891. See supra notes 581-84, 835-36 and accompanying texts.
892. See supra notes 672-74 and accompanying texts.
2001]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
repress the commission of crimes or "to submit the matter to the
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution. '" 93 The duty to
take preventive or repressive action appears to be confined to those acts
which are within the commander's power. 94 This is distinguished from duty
to take all reasonable measures regardless of whether they fall within a
commander's formal scope of authority.9 The ICC's necessary and
reasonable measures standard should be interpreted in light of the facts
and circumstances and an official's scope of authority and, while a
commander cannot be expected to undertake the impossible, a severe
situation may demand particularly strenuous efforts. 96 The provision that
the matter might be submitted to competent authorities recognizes that
individuals exercising "effective command and control" may not be
authorized to directly discipline combatants. 89'
The ICC also imposed responsibility on civilian "superiors" for the
acts of their subordinates over whom they exercised "effective authority
and control., 898 The limitation of liability to civilians who possess "effective
authority and control" appears to relieve civilian officials of the obligation
to exert informal influence and persuasion to affect individuals outside of
the scope of their formal authority. 9 9 This liability attached in those
instances in which superiors failed "to exercise control properly" over their
subordinates9 ° whose actions fell within the superior's "effective
responsibility and control."90' Civilian culpability arose in those instances
in which the superior either knew or "consciously disregarded information
which clearly indicated" that the subordinates were committing or about to
commit crimes. 902 The superior was obligated to take the traditional
"necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power" to prevent
and to punish the crimes or to submit the matter to competent authori-
893. Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 28(2)(c).
894. Id. art. 28(2).
895. See supra notes 588-89 and accompanying texts.
896. See supra notes 679-80 and accompanying texts.
897. See supra notes 694, 750 and accompanying texts.
898. Rome Statute, supra note 27, art. 28(2).
899. See id.
900. Id.
901. Id. art. 28(2)(b).
902. Id. art. 28(2)(a).
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ties. 93 The latter presumably might be necessary in the case of military
matters.9'm
Military commanders and civilian superiors under the ICC Statute
were responsible in those instances in which they possessed knowledge of
delicts 90 ' Military officials also are liable for what they reasonably should
have known while civilians culpability is limited to the conscious disregard
of information which clearly connotes the commission of war crimes.""
This appears to limit the liability of civilian officials to instances of gross
and wanton recklessness entailing a failure to act in response to clear and
compelling evidence of criminal conduct.9 7 Mere inattentiveness, lack of
due care or a failure to monitor or to investigate would not appear to be
908
sufficient to satisfy this standard . The result is that a much lighter burden
of care and concern appears to be imposed upon civilian than military
officials.909
The Rome Statute was created to complement rather than to replace
the jurisdiction of national courts. The international court may not assume
jurisdiction over a case which is being investigated or prosecuted by a State
with recognized grounds to assert jurisdiction over the offense. 90 This
pertains even in those instances in which the State subsequently decides
not to prosecute the person concerned, "unless the decision resulted from
the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute. 9 ' An
individual also may not be prosecuted before the ICC with respect to
conduct which formed the basis of a prior domestic prosecution in which
the defendant was convicted or acquitted. 9" There is an exception in those
instances in which the proceedings were intended to shield the defendant
"from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court;" 91 or in which the proceedings "were not conducted independently
or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process recognized by
903. Id. art. 28(2)(c).
904. See supra notes 694, 750 and accompanying texts.
905. Rome Statute, supra note 27, arts. 28(l)(a), 28(2)(a).
906. Id.
907. See id.
908. See Bruce Broohmhall, The International Criminal Court: Overview and Cooperation
with States, in ICC RATIFICATION AND NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 45, 62-63
(M. Cherif Bassiouni ed. 1999).
909. See supra notes 905-07 and accompanying texts.
910. Rome Statute supra note 27, art. 17(1)(a).
911. Id. art. 17(1)(b).
912. Id. art. 20(3).
913. Id. art. 20(3)(a).
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international law and were conducted in a manner which.., was




Professor Jordon Paust has noted that domestic courts have nar-
rowly interpreted the scope of command liability in order to insulate
domestic officials from criminal culpability."5 The issue arises whether a
national court's decision to impose an actual knowledge standard which
results in a defendant's acquittal would constitute the impermissible
shielding of a defendant from liability.1 6
IX. CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The doctrine of command responsibility is based on the presumption
that military officers and civilian officials possess the knowledge, authority
and power to curb the transgressions of their troops. Command culpability
is designed to encourage military commanders and civilian superiors to
fulfill their legal duty to control the conduct of combatants. This is part of
a constellation of rules which are intended to preserve the humanitarian
impulse which underlies the modern law of war There also is a procedural
purpose, command responsibility provides a convenient mechanism for
apportioning responsibility for international crimes. It likely would be
inordinately time-consuming, complicated, impractical and potentially
unpopular to prosecute the combatants who directly engaged in war crimes
or crimes against humanity. There is an equitable impulse which is satisfied
by imposing primary, if not exclusive, responsibility on high-ranking
officials. A full rendition of a country's conspiratorial design also may not
be clearly and coherently communicated in a prolixity of individual
prosecutions. The extension of culpability, of course, raises the intractable
conflict between the patriotic pursuit of military victory and the preserva-
tion of international legal and moral principle. A commander or superior
who closely controls his or her troops runs the risk of discouraging
battlefield initiative and lowering military morale. On the other hand, the
failure to impose legal controls corrodes the integrity of the code of
conflict and could contribute to chaotic consequences.917
914. Id. art. 20(3)(b).
915. See Jordan Paust, Threats to Accountability After Nuremberg: Crimes Against
Humanity, Leader Responsibility and National Fora 12 N.Y.L. Scfi. J. HUM. RTS. 547, 566
(1995).
916. Id.
917. See supra notes 1-2, 26 and accompanying texts. See generally Comment, supra note 2;
Parks, supra note 123.
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At the same time, command responsibility is a potentially politically
pernicious doctrine which runs the risk of portraying crimes as part of a
coordinated campaign rather than as individually inspired incidents.
Although it may be psychologically satisfying to cast culpability upon a
single soldier or statesperson, the interests in efficiency and utilitarianism
may be outweighed by the fundamental unfairness of, in effect, holding a
single individual responsible for the collective criminal conduct of lower
level combatants, particularly in those instances in which the official
neither planned, ordered, caused or explicitly condoned the delicts. In the
end, the international law of command culpability is caught in a conflict
between expeditiously prosecuting officials through reliance on strict
standards of liability and the equitable interest in requiring the establish-
ment of a specific intent or a reckless or wanton disposition.
918
The notion of command responsibility was articulated by the Com-
mission on Responsibility following World War I."' The United States
Supreme Court, in 1946, provided the first full statement of this doctrine in
Yarnashita.920 The stringency of the strict liability standard was ameliorated
by the Nuremberg Tribunal's actual knowledge test.. and by International
Military Tribunal at Tokyo, which reverted to an actual or constructive
knowledge or negligent disregard standard. 9z2 The Control Council Law
No. 10 decisions demarcated the special responsibility of territorial
commanders.9  The Kahan Commission suggested that a mere notice
requirement might be appropriate for high-level decision-makers.924 The
acquittal of Ernst Medina indicated that there was a temptation to tailor
the standard for command responsibility to the demands of political self-
interest.925 The Geneva Protocol of 1977 provided some uniformity by
setting forth an actual or should have known, gross negligent standard.926
This standard informed and influenced the diverse interpretations of the
International Criminal Courts for Yugoslavia 927and Rwanda.9 s The
918. See id.
919. See supra notes 30-73 and accompanying texts.
920. See supra notes 77-120 and accompanying texts.
921. See supra notes 124-52 and accompanying texts.
922. See supra notes 160-221 and accompanying texts.
923. See supra notes 239-316 and accompanying texts.
924. See supra notes 434-50O and accompanying texts.
925. See supra notes 362-409 and accompanying texts.
926. See supra notes 520-43 and accompanying texts.
927. See supra notes 790-841 and accompanying texts.
928. See supra notes 842-65 and accompanying texts.
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differing approaches to the elements of command responsibility likely will
be expressed in judicial and scholarly consideration of the broad language
of the Rome Statute of the newly-established International Criminal
Court.929
The ICC provision on command responsibility was the culmination of
roughly eighty years of discussion and development. A number of central
provisions of the text remain subject to the vagaries of judicial and
scholarly interpretation. Will knowledge be imputed to officials or will
such awareness be determined on the basis of circumstantial evidence? Is
causality an independent element of command culpability? Should officials
be required to take remedial action that is beyond the formal scope of
their authority? There also is a question whether a reasonable inquiry is
required of military commanders and the determination of the threshold
evidentiary standard for triggering such affirmative action. What are the
parameters of responsibility for territorial commanders? Are there
separate standards for military and civilian officials and for officials at
different levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy? Can the criteria for the
imposition of de facto responsibility be clarified? What are the precise
obligations of political and military officials with knowledge of illegalities
who are not within the chain of command? Can the criteria for civilian
officials be more precisely established? At what point are officials required
to openly protest or to resign?9s° Another concern is the failure to
empirically analyze the impact of the various legal standards in light of
self-protective nature of military bureaucracies.
In the end, command responsibility is not merely of academic interest.
It provides the primary mechanism through which to bring the high-level
perpetrators of international crimes to the bar of justice. The threat of
criminal trial promises to provide the best prospect for discouraging
dictators from condoning the violation of human rights. At the same time,
the obligation of individuals confronted with delicts and depredations
remains a central conundrum of our increasingly bureaucratic age.
929. See generally supra notes 871-916 and accompanying texts.
930. See generally Eckhardt, supra note 1; Major Michael L. Smidt, Yamashita, Medina,
and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Operations, 164 MIL. L. REV. 153
(2000).
931. See generally TRENT ANGERS, THE FORGOTrEN HERO OF MY LAI: THE HUGH
THOMPSON STORY (1999).
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Globalization has exacerbated this dilemma by increasing the awareness of
the often diverse demands of national and international law."'
Missing from the jurisprudence of command responsibility is the
moral dimension. The legal niceties divert attention from the question of
whether there is an ethical imperative or privilege to intervene to prevent
war crimes, whatever the scope of an official's formal command or control.
The costs of quiescence are considerable and, yet, individuals who act to
uphold the rule of international law often are denigrated and dismissed.933
It is a cruel irony that these people of conscience have largely been
abandoned by transnational law.934
932. See generally Anthony D'Amato, Agora: Superior Orders vs. Command Responsibil-
ity, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 604 (1986); Howard S. Levie, Some Comments on Professor
D'Amato's "Paradox," 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 608 (1986).
933. See generally Matthew Lippman, First Strike Nuclear Weapons and the Justifiability of
Civil Resistance Under International Law, 2 TEMP. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 155 (1988); Matthew
Lippman, Civil Resistance: Revitalizing International Law in the Nuclear Age, 13 WHITrIER
L. REV. 17 (1992).
934. See generally Matthew Lippman, The White Rose: Judges and Justice in the Third
Reich, 15 CONN. J. INT'L L. 95 (2000).
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